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Financial crimes in the banking sector have caused the downfall of several banks in Kenya. The 
success rate of prosecutions and the ability of regulators, as well as law enforcement to curtail 
financial crime has been under challenge. This is true despite various enacted comprehensive 
legislation and institutions at their disposal, to curtail financial crimes. This study focuses on 
money laundering in the banking sector. The objectives of the study are to establish the causes of 
money laundering in the Kenyan banking sector; the challenges hindering effective enforcement 
of money laundering laws and regulations in the banking sector; on one hand, and the other to 
suggest possible measures that would help deter the crime. The study applied qualitative research 
methods and examination of relevant case laws. The study was able to identify the enforcement 
measures against money laundering in the banking sector to include a series of correlative 
measures composed of both preventive and law enforcement procedures. The preventive measures 
are carried out by the banking institutions to inhibit the infiltration of illicit money into the system. 
These include; carrying out customer due diligence, reporting any transactions that appear to be 
suspicious to the FRC and keeping financial transaction records. Law enforcement agents, on the 
other hand, step in to complement these preventive procedures by using measures such as financial 
sanctions, investigating predicate offences, confiscating assets acquired through illicit proceeds, 
and prosecuting banks found to be culpable. The study identified some of the problems facing the 
enforcement measures against money laundering to include: voluntary and involuntary violations 
of the AML legislation by banks, corruption, discretionary powers of the different enforcement 
agents, lack of resources that would help in the investigation and prosecution of the offence, 
presence of rogue banking officials in the banking sector and the multiplicity of agents in the 
enforcement process. The study analysed the different laws mandated to fight the offence in Kenya, 
such as the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Anti-Corruption and 
Economics Crime Act, the Banking Act, and the Central Bank Act. From the examination of the 
law, the study established that some loopholes in the law that have caused enforcement to be at a 
minimal pace despite the efforts of the legislators in ensuring that the anti-money laundering laws 
are in tandem with the international best practices, such as the FATF Recommendations. The study 
concluded that, Kenya appears to have the proper mechanisms to combat and prevent money 
laundering, which if observed to would ensure prevention of the offence, nonetheless, the 
identified challenges bring about problems in the enforcement of the law and its measures. The 
 
 
findings suggest what could be done to improve the enforcement procedures regarding money 
laundering. These include, banks refraining from superficial compliance of the law, the provision 
of adequate resources to the enforcement agents, use of alternative sanctions to complement the 
monetary fines, prosecution of banks found culpable and sealing of the various loopholes in the 
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Elod defines money laundering as illicit money transfer which involves a series of transactions 
which aims to make illegally obtained money appear legal1. Banks are often being implicated in 
the offence when they facilitate such transactions. These transactions occur in the following 
manner; the illegally obtained money is placed into the banking institution by making a deposit 
into an account, the money is then layered through various transactions to hide the criminal source, 
and finally, the newly laundered money is  channeled  into the economy2. It is indicated by Tucker, 
that the entire process obscures the true origin of the funds, thus causing difficulties for 
enforcement agencies to prosecute the crime as it happens. This is also increasingly difficult in 
circumstances where the transactions do not raise the suspicion of being proceeds of crime, and 
appear to genuine when they are illicit3. 
Banks as financial institutions play a fundamental role in facilitating financial transactions, thus 
enabling the movement of funds in the economy. It is therefore a principal obligation for financial 
institutions to accept monetary deposits from its customers and enable cash transfers when 
requested. However, Muragura notes that in doing so they face a higher risk of possible misuse by 
criminals for money laundering purposes4.  
Additionally, banks have financial records which are highly resourceful in determining physical 
transactions and are often the only evidence of their occurrence. It is also notable that criminals 
will always try to find a way to obscure their source of illicit proceeds, through banks, to fund 
legal or illegal ventures5. 
                                                          
1Előd T, ‘A Theory of “Crying wolf: The economics of money laundering enforcement,’ IMF Working Paper 07/81, 
2007, 7. 
2 Nagel P, and Wieman C, ‘Money Laundering’, 52, American Criminal Law Review, 1357,2015. 
3Tucker R, ‘When bankers look the other way: suspicious activity requires vigilance, not avoidance,’ 14 Business Law 
Today, 5, 2005, 27. 
4  Gikonyo C, ‘Banks in Kenya and anti-money laundering obligations: the conflicts of interests arising,’ 
2020,https://www.emerald.com.ezproxy.library.strathmore.edu/insight/search?q=Banks+in+Kenya+and+anti-
money+laundering+obligations%3A+the+conflicts+of+interests+arising  
5 Plombeck T, ‘Confidentiality and disclosure: The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and Banking Secrecy’, 
2, The international Lawyer,1,1988,69-988. 
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This was the case in 2001, where the Charterhouse Bank in Kenya received an international 
transfer of 30 million dollars from the United States (US) in the account of one of its customers. 
This caused suspicion amongst the banks’ officials who immediately informed the Central Bank 
of Kenya (CBK) following the prudential regulations, which mandated them to report transfers of 
more than 500,000 US dollars. The report prompted the Banking Fraud Investigations Unit (BFIU) 
to apply to the court, for the account to be frozen, on the notion that the money was connected to 
criminal proceeds. Nonetheless, during the court proceedings. The recipients of the money argued 
efficaciously that the funds did not stem from illicit activities, but rather from a charitable 
organisation in the US, which had intended to make investments in a Kenya by way of charitable 
contributions, which was fallacious6.  
The Chatter House Bank scenario gives a clear picture of how banks can be used as conduits of 
illicit money transfers. In certain cases, banks are aware of this, and may also opt not to report 
such suspicious transactions intentionally, and even collaborate with money launderers and help 
to facilitate the crime. 
This could be the reason why the available data globally submits that the Anti-Money Laundering 
(AML) regime has not had major effects in conquering the crime7.This is regardless of the 
preventive and enforcement measures against the offence8. Angella finds that ultimately, financial 
crimes including money laundering,  if not dealt with, ends up causing damage to banking 
institutions, by way of diverting resources to criminals, and eventually encouraging other forms 
financial crimes9.  
It has also been reported that Kenya’s financial and economic sector loses around 40 billion 
annually due to unlawful financial transfers, part of the contributory factor being the lack of 
compliance to the preventive measures against illegal cash transfers by banks10. As a result, the 
government of Kenya has enacted several laws to help curb money laundering offences by banking 
                                                          
6Peter W, ‘ Detecting and investigating money laundering in Kenya,’2006, https://issafrica.org/chapter-4-detecting-
and-investigating-money-laundering-in-kenya , on 24 November 2018. 
7Micheal L and Peter R, ‘Money laundering,’ 34 Crime and Justice, 1, 2006, 289-375. 
8Micheal L and Peter R, ‘Money laundering,’ 34 Crime and Justice, 1, 2006, 289-375. 
9Angella B and Willy M, ‘Do economic crimes affect Kenya’s economic growth? A cointegration approach,’4, 
International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management ,11,2016. 
10Barasa T, Illicit financial flows in Kenya: mapping of the literature and synthesis of the evidence, August 
2018,http://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Kenya-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Report.pdf, on 8 May 2019. 
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institutions, but the execution of these laws has not been easy due to numerous challenges faced 
in their enforcement.  
The first initiative was through the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Laundering Act 2009 
(POCAMLA)11.The Act aligned Kenya to the international standards that combat money 
laundering and financial crimes. It addressed the concerns about money laundering and other 
related crimes and ushered in strong compliance standards for the Kenyan banking, and insurance 
sectors12.This was followed by the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations13 
by the CBK, issued in 2013.These laws, however, were not an assurance that the war to counter 
money laundering would be easier, especially in the financial sector, in situations where banks 
would engage in deliberate violations of the law or even partner with criminals to assist in 
laundering illicit proceeds.  
Additionally, the laws mandated institutional agents such as to curb the CBK, the Kenya Assets 
Recovery Agency(ARA),the Financial Reporting Center(FRC) and the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (ODPP)14 to ensure they implement the enforcement measures which would 
complement preventive measures by banks. Nonetheless, the country since 2009 has been seen to 
remain vulnerable to money laundering offences, especially where banks aid such transactions. 
The inadequacies posed by the POCAMLA 2009 such as the incapability of ARA to specially 
handle all asset recovered from the predicate offences relate to money laundering, and the FRC 
being limited to only collecting data concerning the offence15, necessitated amendments to seal 
such regulatory gaps. The aim was to avoid any setbacks created by them, and avoid rogue 
financial institutions from abusing such loopholes. Furthermore, the loopholes in the law made the 
legislation weak, by causing difficulty in enforcement and giving rise to other economic vices like 
                                                          
11Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
12Sharon C, ‘A perspective on Kenya’s Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act’ April 
2017,http://www.africapractice.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/africapractice-A-perspective-on-Kenyas-Proceeds-
of-Crime-and-Anti-Mon....pdf on 27 November 2018. 
13 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 2013. 
14Barasa T, Illicit financial flows in Kenya: mapping of the literature and synthesis of the evidence, August 
2018,http://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Kenya-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Report.pdf, on 8 May 2019. 
15 Sharon C, ‘A perspective on Kenya’s Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act’ April 
2017,http://www.africapractice.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/africapractice-A-perspective-on-Kenyas-Proceeds-
of-Crime-and-Anti-Mon....pdf on 2 October, 2020. 
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corruption16. In order to deal with the regulatory gaps, amendments were done to POCAMLA 2009 
by way of the Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering (Amendment) Act 2017. 
The Amendment Act17, laid out novel legal sanctions against financial crimes, and set out and 
improved the procedures related to, tracking, freezing, seizing, and confiscating criminal 
proceeds18. It also established the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA)19as the main agent to deal with 
all cases pertaining to the recovery of criminal proceeds and refurbished the powers and mandates 
of the Financial Reporting Center (FRC). This was done in line with the Financial Action 
Taskforce Recommendations (FATF), which outlines what needs to be done by countries 
implement  to fight money laundering and terrorist financing20. 
 Despite the milestones, enforcement of the law and the prescribed measures has still bedeviled 
the government. Many challenges continued to persist. According to Barasa, such challenges 
included: the susceptibility of Kenya’s economic sector to a wide range of financiers with good, 
or corrupt intentions; lack of inter-agency teamwork between the regulators of the financial sector, 
financial institutions and the enforcement agents; other emerging loopholes in the existing laws 
governing the institutional agents in fighting money laundering, predicate offences and negligence 
by financial institutions 21.  
These setbacks were verified by the fact that the CBK, in the year 2018, had to fine five banks for 
violating various provisions of the law regarding money laundering which included: failing to 
report large cash transactions; not carrying out satisfactory customer due diligence; failure to 
                                                          
16A Perspective on Kenya’s Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, 2017 
 http://www.africapractice.com/snap-shots/a-perspective-on-kenyas-proceeds-of-crime-and-anti-money-laundering-
amendment-act-2017/ on 24 November 2018. 
17The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Amendment Act, 2017. 
18Barasa T, Illicit financial flows in Kenya: mapping of the literature and synthesis of the evidence, August 
2018,http://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Kenya-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Report.pdf, on 8 May 2019. 
19Section 53(1), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 0f 2009). 
20 http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html on 5 
October,2020. 
21Barasa T, Illicit financial flows in Kenya: mapping of the literature and synthesis of the evidence,22,August 
2018,http://www.pasgr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Kenya-Illicit-Financial-Flows-Report.pdf, on 8 May 2019. 
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produce records that would back up large transactions that they had done and gaps in the reporting 
of Suspicious Transactions (STRs), contrary to several provisions of the POCAMLA22. 
Additionally, Serah notes other challenges hindering effective enforcement include feeble internal 
controls in banks, conspiracy amid employees in banks and lack of segregation of duties of 
different regulatory and enforcement bodies, and sometimes political interference which creates 
circumstances that cause the inability to prosecute these financial crimes23. 
Notwithstanding the amendments and efforts by the CBK, the AML laws and regulations have not 
been able to accomplish much due to recurrent incidences of money laundering cases in the 
financial sector. For these reasons, I seek to critically analyse the enforcement procedures of 
money laundering in the Kenyan banking sector, and suggest possible solutions which can be 
applied by the enforcement agencies to help deter the crime.  
1.2. Research Problem 
The AML regime is aimed at preventing and enforcing certain measures directed at curbing money 
laundering. Preventive measures are mostly done by banks to shield them from the infiltration of 
criminal proceeds, and where they fail the law enforcement steps in to implement other 
enforcement measures such as the prosecution of the lawbreakers. 
Many factors can cause the enforcement of the AML regime to be challenging, such as corruption, 
rogue employees in banking institutions and poor detection mechanisms in banks24. These factors 
consequently create difficulties for the law enforcers who fight the crime25. The situation is at 
times aggravated by the use of different agencies such as the EACC, ARA, the National Police, 
KRA and CBK which all have different motives, that may create a conflict of interest in the 
                                                          
22The CBK Press release https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/press_releases/104465402_Press%20Release%20-
%20Investigations%20of%20Banks%20Related%20to%20National%20Youth%20Service%20Transactions.pdf,  on 
28 January 2018. 
23Serah A, ‘Prosecuting bank fraud in Kenya: challenges faced by the banking sector,” 14 Journal of Finance and 
Management, 1, 2015, 3. 
24Reuter P and Truman E, ‘Chasing dirty money: the fight against money laundering’ Washington DC Institute for 
International Economics, 2004, 132–133. 
25Reuter P and Truman E, ‘Chasing dirty money: the fight against money laundering’ Washington DC Institute for 
International Economics, 2004, 132–133. 
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enforcement procedures hence making the process complicated, and not produce the intended 
outcome.  
The battle against money laundering in Kenya has also been weighed heavily by continual 
violations of the AML laws by banks either unintentionally or knowingly, such as contravening 
preventive measures such as reporting obligations in place or even facilitating the money 
laundering process. It has been observed that if the fight against money laundering is not effective, 
there is an increase in the crime, and the banks become more susceptible to other forms of financial 
crimes, ultimately weakening public trust on the banking industry26. 
This, therefore, calls for an analysis of the enforcement procedures of laws and regulations against 
money laundering offences banks in Kenya, and for this reasons this reason, the study will seek to 
critically analyse the enforcement procedures against it and suggest what may likely be done to 
improve them. 
1.3. Research Hypotheses 
H1: Anti-money laundering legislation does not deter banks in Kenya from engaging in unlawful 
financial activities. 
H2: It is assumed that in instances where banks are likely to collaborate with money launderers, 
the enforcement of statutes against illicit financial activities becomes impossible on practical 
grounds.  
1.4. Research Objectives 
1.4.1. General objective 
i. To examine the enforcement procedures in place against money laundering offences by 
banks in Kenya. 
1.4.2. Other Objectives  
ii. To critically examine the challenges faced within the confines of the enforcement 
procedures aimed to counter money laundering in the Kenyan banking sector. 
                                                          
26Idowu A, Obasan K, ‘Anti-Money laundering policy and its effects on bank performance in Nigeria,’5 Business 
Intelligence Journal, 2, 367, 2012. 
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iii. To critically evaluate the loopholes in the legal framework on the enforcement of the laws 
against money laundering in the Kenyan banking sector.  
iv. To suggest possible solutions in countering money laundering in the Kenyan banking 
sector. 
1.5. Research Questions  
i. What are the measures established to facilitate the enforcement laws against money 
laundering the Kenyan banking sector? 
ii. In what ways have the enforcement measures, impacted the enforcement of the crime a?  
iii. What are the loopholes in the law concerning to the enforcement procedures against 
money laundering, that cause banks in Kenya to violate them?  
iv. What are the possible solutions that will help in deterring money laundering offences by 
banks in Kenya? 
1.6. Limitations of the Study 
Money laundering is a global problem and affects other institutions apart from banks. However, 
this research will be limited to financial institutions specifically banks in Kenya. The reason being 
that Kenyan banks have been in the spotlight for the wrong reasons, such as deliberately violating 
AML preventive measures. Yet, enforcement against such violations has been minimal, evidenced 
by fewer convictions of banking officials and banking institutions suspected or found to be at fault.  
For that reason, the study does not examine violations of other financial institutions such as 
mortgage companies, insurance companies, credit unions and brokerage firms. The study focuses 
on enforcement procedures against money laundering to shed a light on them and elicit the legal 
challenges and loopholes faced by the enforcement of the same.  
There has been hardly any conviction of banks found to have committed money laundering 
offences, since the enactment of the law in Kenya. As a result, there is scant case law on the 
prosecution of banks in Kenya hence no jurisprudence has been established on enforcement of the 
offence by banks. Consequently, the cases examined comprise of judicial petitions, judicial 
8 
  
applications and judicial reviews, to show the attempts made to enforce the POCAMLA in Kenya, 
and the difficulties arising from the same.  
The study did not delve into corporate governance deficiencies by banks but rather the 
implementation of laws and regulations. This is because corporate governance deals with the 
internal affairs of a company and its management, and may not necessarily be linked to the 
enforcement of AML measures. 
1.7. Significance of the Study 
Money laundering activities can cause devastating impacts on the economy of Kenya such as 
making it hard for a legitimate business to thrive or by destroying customer trust in banking 
institutions.  
The study will analyse some of the reasons why banks facilitate or commit money laundering 
offences, and recommend strategies that can be employed by the law enforcers to ensure effective 
enforcement of the law. The findings will suggest what could be done to improve the enforcement 
procedures against money laundering by the law enforcement agents and ensure that they work 
efficiently to deter the crime, and to lessen instances where banks collaborate with money 
launderers.  
The study can be of importance to the policymakers by assisting them in coming up with ways of 
sealing the regulatory loopholes in the legal framework that will help improve the enforcement 
procedures against the offence, especially in the use of the different agents in fighting the crime.  
To the CBK in helping it to find ways of preventing institutional collaborations by banks and 
money launderers in facilitating the crime, and ensuring the proper implementation of preventive 
measures against the offence. 
To fellow researchers, the challenges examined herein can provide further areas of research 
concerning the prevention and enforcement of the AML regime in Kenya.   
1.8. Theoretical Framework 
The theories that will be applied to analyse of the enforcement procedures against money 
laundering in the Kenyan banking sector, will be the sanction theory and the agency theory. The 
sanction theory will be used to reinforce the reasons behind the deterrence of crime, and why 
9 
  
obliging banking institutions to conform legislation against money laundering is important for 
financial stability and economic growth. The agency theory will be used to build a case on the 
agency problem created by the use of multiple agents to carry out the roles allocated to them by 
the legal statutes in enforcing AML laws. 
1.8.1. John Austin’s Sanction Theory  
According to Austin, the law is made up of rules simply laid down for the guidance of intelligent 
beings backed up by sanctions27. He belonged to the positive school of thought that understood 
laws to be commands separate from morality28. According to him, these laws were therefore 
parameters to the subjects, by instituting compliance even in the absence of the lawmaker29. Where 
the subjects chose to disobey the law, sanctions were then executed upon them to ensure 
compliance. The fear of being punished was supposed to cause habitual compliance with the laws 
and regulations in place30. 
Similarly, banks as corporate institutions are supposed to adhere to the AML measures or face 
repercussions in the form of sanctions, which are financial.  The government of Kenya has enacted 
laws against money laundering which govern the banking sector. These laws play the role of 
commands which are supposed to be obeyed by the banks and the enforcement agencies. It is 
therefore expected that corporations as legal persons obey them. Banks are reporting bodies under 
the legislation against Money laundering in Kenya31. They are therefore mandated to monitor all 
financial transactions carried out by them, report any suspicious activities to the FRC, and refrain 
from facilitating illicit transfers of money. 
Failure to report these suspicious transactions, or facilitating illicit transactions amounts to a crime 
and warrants the use of sanctions established by the government to impose habitual compliance 
with the law. These penalties are enforced by the sovereign’s agents which are the law 
                                                          
27Stumpff A, ‘Law is the command of the sovereign: HLA. Hart reconsidered’, 29 Ratio 
Juris,2016  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2476005 , on 23 April 2019. 
28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 8, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/austin-john on 5 
October,2020.  
29Tapper C, ‘Austin on sanctions,’ 23 Cambridge Law Journal, 2, 1965, 277-283. 
30Tapper C, ‘Austin on sanctions,’ 23 Cambridge Law Journal, 2, 1965, 277-283. 
31The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009), and the Prudential Guidelines 2013. 
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implementation agencies, and the CBK as the financial regulator of banking institutions, to deter 
these banks from engaging in repeated violations of the law. 
This theory will be used to analyse the flaws in the enforcement procedures against money 
laundering. It will further be used to explain whether the use of sanctions provided by the statutes 
have been effective in preventing the recurring violation of these laws by banks. Furthermore, if 
they have had any impact in achieving behavioral change and deterrence in banks which engage 
in the crime. This regardless of how symbolic as they are32.  
It is also the belief that punitive financial sanctions act as a form of preventive measures to 
effectively deter banks from noncompliance with the law. This study seeks to examine if this has 
been the case especially in the banking sector where such financial penalties are used to curb the 
offence.  
1.8.2. The Agency Theory  
The agency theory was first proposed by Ross and Mitnick. Ross is responsible for the economic  
proposal of the theory, whereas Mitnick is known for proposing the institutional usage of the 
theory33.In the legal sphere, common law has made use of the agency theory to illustrate legal 
implications of individuals or institutions acting as agents on behalf of their principals, and the 
shortcomings of such relationships34. 
The agency theory will be used the illustrate the legal consequences of using institutional agents 
in the implementation of enforcement of AML measures, and the consequences arising from the 
same. This will be done by conceptualizing the relationship among the agents under the agency 
theory.  
The CBK and the FRC play the role of the principals and the law implementation institutions act 
as agents. They all have the main goal of preventing and deterring the offence of money laundering, 
but the agency problem can arise where the agents and principals pursue their own goals and fail 
                                                          
32Tan V, ‘The art of deterrence: Singapore’s anti-money laundering regimes’, 25 Journal of Financial Crime, 2, 2018, 
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33https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228124397_Origin_of_the_Theory_of_Agency_An_Account_By_One_
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to act in harmony due to different interests they may opt to pursue. For instance, CBK may want 
to impose punishments against banks that contravene the laws but it is mainly interested in the 
continued existence of banks and aims to prevent systemic risks. Conversely, the law 
implementation agencies may be more interested in the criminal trials of the banks, which may 
threaten the financial soundness of banks, by damaging their reputation and causing systemic risk, 
consequently threatening their existence. 
The CBK has a supervisory role over banks in Kenya, this includes providing with prudential 
regulations that guide banks in preventing the transfer of illicit money. It is aided by the FRC an 
intelligence center, that receives and collects information reported by banks about suspicious 
financial transactions, and then shares the information to the law execution agencies such the 
National Police Service, EACC, KRA and the ARA which assist in the implementation of the law 
through execution of different penalties. 
The law has enabled each agency to carry out different functions relating to law enforcement, 
which at times creates a decentralised approach in the execution of their roles. This decentralisation 
may lead to multiplicity of roles, and different motivations in carrying out their mandates.  
The agency theory will be used to show what hinders law enforcers to be efficient especially where 
coordination is dependent on a hierarchical chain that is decentralised. This is through the use of 
different agents, and the consequent effects on the enforcement measures in place.  
1.10. Research Methodology 
This research applied qualitative and case law analysis methods to explore on money laundering 
offences by banks and enforcement procedures. Qualitative research was used to find out the 
reasons behind the challenges faced in the enforcement procedures and why banks commit money 
laundering offences.  
Case law analysis was used to examine interpretations by the courts on the rules and the principles 
in cases where banks or its officials were accused of the offence, the penalties provided against 
banks that committed the offence, and the challenges courts face in the enforcement of the law 
against the crime. The secondary data such as reports, journal articles, statutes and books were 




1.11. Chapter Breakdown  
Chapter i introduces the background of the study, the research problem, research hypothesis, 
research objectives, the scope and limitations of the study, significance of the study and the 
theoretical frameworks. 
Chapter ii focuses on relevant literature on the enforcement procedures against money laundering 
offences by banking institutions in Kenya. 
Chapter iii reviews the legal and regulatory framework on enforcement of money laundering and 
how they apply to banking institutions in Kenya. 
Chapter iv examines the enforcement of the laws and regulation by examining relevant case laws 
concerning money laundering offences in the banking sector and effort of banks to curb the same 
in Kenya. 
Chapter v gives the conclusions and suggests possible solutions to help improve the enforcement 













2.0 The Enforcement Procedures against Money Laundering and Challenges 
Faced by Banks, and the Law enforcement in Fighting the Crime   
2.1. Introduction 
The enforcement of AML regime is composed of a broad range of financial supervisory measures 
that include; preventive measures, related sanctions and other corrective actions that are used by 
the law enforcers in the banking sector35. The CBK is oversees the implementation of these 
measures as a supervisory body over banks in Kenya. 
The preventive measures are composed of internal controls which are protective against the 
transmission of illicit funds through the banking system 36. These include, performing customer 
due diligence37, documenting monetary transactions38  making reports on any monetary transaction 
that appears to be unusual39. These three measures present a present the aspect of enforcement 
procedures carried out by banks before other government actors come into play. They are all aimed 
at averting the infiltration of criminal money into the economy, and to discourage facilitation of 
the criminal transactions and to ensure banks adhere to these, sanctions are established by the law 
for deterrence.  
Law enforcement agents come into come into play with additional enforcement mechanisms to 
complement the preventive measures. Such include inspecting books of accounts by the CBK and 
FRC, which also include, issuing warning letters and financial penalties for non-compliance. In 
addition, the ARA performs the role of tracking criminal property, criminal and civil forfeiture of 
realizable property, and obtaining orders to monitor the same, whereas the court enforces this by 
ensuring compliance of those orders, and by issuing restraint orders to suspects to prevent them 
from dealing with the realizable property. The DPP on the other hand receives cases to conduct 
                                                          
35 Chasing dirty money,https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA-Effective-supervision-and-
enforcement.pdf on 24 July 2020 
36 Chasing dirty money,https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/RBA-Effective-supervision-and-
enforcement.pdf on 24 July 2020. 
37Section 45, Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
38Section 46, Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009).  
39Section 44, Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009).  
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criminal prosecution for the most serious AML breaches, after investigations have been 
conducted40.These measures and procedures can either be conducted separately or complementary 
by the law enforcement agents41. 
These enforcement procedures are nonetheless faced with several challenges, which make the 
prosecution of the offence of money laundering by banks difficult. These challenges include; the 
presence of rogue officials in the banking sector, discretionary powers granted to different agents 
which may influence the investigation or prosecution of the offence, the use of multi-agency 
partnerships in the enforcement of the offence, corruption and technological advancements in the 
commission of the offence. 
This chapter is going to discuss the enforcement measures under the AML regime in Kenya, and 
point out the challenges faced in the process of fighting the crime. 
2.2 Preventive Measures by Banks and their Challenges 
2.2.1. Customer Due Diligence and Record Keeping  
Due diligence reports by banks can be termed as their critical analysis of data relating to potential 
customers intending to transact with the bank, or customers who already own accounts with the 
bank. Afande states that it is a process designed to gather sufficient data concerning customers or 
potential customers, and in due course create a database of their records and transactions. He goes 
on to say, such information may entail the nature of the business transactions they are involved in, 
the ultimate recipients of the funds, and the source of their funds42. The reasons for collecting such 
information among others are, to validate the customer’s identity and to identify transactions which 
appear to be strange43. Where this is noted, banking officials will be required to make reports to 
the relevant authority. 
Several problems could be encountered in this process such as the insufficiency of the information 
collected, which may be linked to inadequately trained personnel mandated to carry out this role. 
                                                          
40 The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
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42Afande O, ‘Use of regulatory policies in the fight against money laundering in Kenya,’5 Public Policy and 
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Such information could then be inaccurate or incomplete, and could likely pose difficulties if relied 
on by law enforcers in the tracking of the source of illicit proceeds. 
For instance, bank employees carrying out the due diligence reports may choose to ignore crucial 
information such as failing to ask for the identification documents, and verifying if they are 
credible. Satish claims that even with these preventive measures, banking officials who willfully 
decide to turn a blind eye in their duties while performing due diligence cause a hindrance in 
preventing the crime. He further adds that reasons behind this could be attributable to their own 
motivations, or their institutional interests. Such instances then allow money launderers to be able 
to collude with financial institutions that will help them facilitate their transfer of criminal 
proceeds44. Yeoh additionally argues that, where supervisory bodies in the financial sector fail to 
continually monitor banks, rules will be consistently disobeyed45. 
The above occurrences tend to suggest that when due diligence seems to fail, the preventive 
internal controls might be judged as weak and considered to be the major cause of the above 
incidences, but on the contrary, even with strong internal controls that have well-functioning 
preventive measures, some banks in Kenya still opt to facilitate the offence.  
This then creates concerns on whether, the supervisory role of the CBK as empowered by its Act46 
to give guidelines that are supposed to help in creating a firm and effective financial system (In 
exercise of these powers, the CBK has made the Regulations on Money Laundering, which is the 
most deliberate attempt under Kenyan law to curb the offence at present) in ensuring the 
implementation of these measures, through formal warnings and administrative penalties 
implementation internal controls against money laundering indeed work?  
This study will thus examine penalties outlined by the law, issued by the CBK and other law 
enforcement bodies in Kenya, and find out if they have played any significant role in reducing the 
offence being committed by banks.  
                                                          
44Satish M, ‘Recent anti‐ money laundering enforcement actions: lessons to be learned at others' expense’, 7 Journal 
of Investment Compliance, 3, 2006. 
45Yeoh P, ‘Enhancing effectiveness of anti-money laundering laws through whistleblowing, ‘17 Journal 
of Money Laundering Control,3,2014, 327–342. 
46The Central Bank of Kenya Act, Cap 491. 
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2.2.2 Reporting of Suspicious Transactions  
Suspicious transactions are considered to be those that seem unusual according to Naheem. He 
adds that a myriad of factors can be observed to know whether a transaction is suspicious, and this 
range from strange behaviors of the customers, through patterns of their transactions via their 
accounts. He further notes that this places reporting institutions with a greater responsibility of 
ensuring they act swiftly, by making reports to the relevant agency whenever they sense that 
transactions appear to be wary47. 
The significance of suspicious reporting is to help law enforcers start a criminal investigations, 
which are important to facilitate implementation of the law48. Such investigations, assist them to 
build a case against unusual transactions. They help to ascertain whether such transactions appear 
to be fraudulent or aim to cover up a specific crime by persons making them. However, it is also 
the possible that banks may not be in a position to unearth wary financial schemes and make reports 
of the same. Contrariwise, in some instances they can also make numerous reports of the same but 
supervisory bodies fail to act upon them49. This may be due their credibility or the laxity of law 
enforcers. 
For instance, Lowe refutes the reliability of STRs. He argues that information which may be 
obtained from them is not be strong because the intelligence collected, requires law enforcement 
agents to go back to previous banking records of the suspects, which only gives a snapshot of their 
former transactions, hence may not show any form of risk or suspicion50. Consequently, such 
information may not build a solid criminal case against the perpetrators, or even satisfy the 
standard of proof in a criminal prosecution. This is also the case where the reports filed are 
defensive. Eugene indicates that, such reports contain voluminous details of transactions, which 
can be insignificant, hence of no use to the law enforcers51. 
                                                          
47Naheem M, ‘Suspicious alerts in money laundering – the Crédit Agricole case’, 24 Journal of Financial Crime, 
4,2017,691-703. 
48 He Ping, ‘The Suspicious transactions reporting system,’ 8 Journal of Money Laundering Control,3, 2005, 252-
259. 
49 He Ping, ‘The Suspicious transactions reporting system,’ 252-259. 
50Lowe J, ‘Anti-money laundering –the need for intelligence’, 24 Journal of Financial Crime, 3,472-479,2017. 
51Mniwasa E, ‘The financial intelligence unit and money laundering control in Tanzania,’22 Journal of Money 
Laundering Control,3,2019, 543–562. 
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Additionally, Naheem affirms the difficulty of actually determining whether a transaction is 
suspicious or not. He points out that valid business transactions could also create false alarms in 
some circumstances, this is because the precise nature of each transaction cannot be verified all 
the time. He calls for the revision of the term, to broaden its meaning, to capture what might be 
termed as suspicious in the current society52. 
Moreover the law53 criminalises the offence of tipping off. This offence occurs if the bank discloses 
any information relating to the STRs to their customers. Muragura indicates that, at times, the 
reporting requirements can involuntarily cause the suspected criminals to be aware of impending 
or continuing money laundering investigations54. This happens when the accounts are frozen to 
facilitate investigations. In such circumstances, the suspects can find other ways of hiding evidence 
that may link them to the offence. 
Questions have also been raised on whether financial intelligence centers, such as the FRC, utilise 
the reports filed with them. A close look at the FRCs website55 to date does not reveal the existence 
of yearly reports on the utilisation of STRs, and the number of cases directed to the ODPP for 
prosecution. Goodfellow posits that the absence of feedbacks from financial intelligence centers 
on the reports made, and actions that have been taken, counters the measures adopted to maintain 
high standards in compliance with the laws and regulation56. One is left to question whether such 
reports made by the banks in Kenya have been of any use in curbing the crime or if there is any 
need to make such reports at all. Furthermore, if reports are made to the FRC for analysis, and it 
takes too long before the matter is referred to the enforcement agencies, the delay creates a setback 
in the enforcement process.  
It has also been argued by Kayuni that STRs alone are not adequate to prove the existence of 
money laundering. He states that law enforcers should come to terms with the reality that predicate 
                                                          
52Naheem M, ‘Suspicious alerts in money laundering – the Crédit Agricole case’, 691-703. 
53The proceeds of crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
54Muragura N, ‘The jeopardy of the bank in enforcement of normative anti-money laundering and countering 
financing of terrorism regimes,’ 18 Journal of Money Laundering Control,3,2015. 
55http://www.frc.go.ke/ on 25 September 2019. 
56Goodfellow B and Lokanan M, ‘Anti-money laundering and moral intensity in suspicious activity reporting an 
application of Jones’ issue contingent model,’21 Journal of Money Laundering Control, 4, 2018, 520-533. 
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offences can help in tracing the criminal proceeds57. Kenya acknowledges the existence of such 
offences as falling under the category of economic crimes. 
This study will examine whether STRs have been used to bring any money laundering charges 
against banks or their officials. It will further seek to find instances where banks have failed to file 
such reports. It will also explore situations in which if they have been of any use in curbing illicit 
transactions by banks, and attempt to address the consequences of failure by the to file such reports. 
Moreover, it will seek address how predicate crimes have been used to fight the offence. 
2.2.3. Financial Sanctions 
Banks commit AML breaches voluntarily or non-voluntarily. According to Tan, banks engage in 
voluntary violation of AML preventive measures when they are aware that they will reap a greater 
financial benefit from those violations. On the other hand, it is non-voluntary when the banks fail 
to implement proper internal control measures hence falling to detect or report STRs58. Financial 
sanctions are supposed to act as form of deterrence to prevent the above situations from happening. 
The Kenyan AML regime has laid down hefty financial penalties for both individuals and 
corporate bodies who violate it. It is however not clear if they act as a form of deterrence or not, 
especially for banks which aim to make profitable business ventures, regardless of such penalties. 
The study aims to find out the effect of such sanctions on Kenyan banking institutions and their 
effect in the preventing the transmission of illicit proceeds through them. 
2.3. Challenges Faced in the Enforcement Procedures against Money Laundering  
2.3.1. Confiscation of Illicit Proceeds 
Confiscation is legal term under the AML regime which implies to the process persons or 
institutions suspected to have engaged in money laundering are deprived of their ill-gotten gains59. 
The aim is to ensure that criminals do not benefit from illicit profits generated through crime60. 
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It entails a series of investigative processes which aim to establish the persons or institutions 
behind the crime, identifying the source of their illicit funds, assets that can be confiscated, and 
developing evidence to be used in criminal proceedings61.Confiscation in Kenya is done through 
civil and criminal forfeiture of assets. Anusha and Aspalella state that, criminal forfeiture of illicit 
proceeds entails a criminal trial which is conducted in personam, and if the suspect is found guilty, 
they are convicted or fined. they further add  that, civil forfeiture on the other hand  is done after 
obtaining court orders amounts to seize the property suspected to been obtained through illicit 
proceeds, regardless of its owner’s guilt or innocence62.  
Transparency international notes that, the Kenyan asset recovery regime is subject to civil judicial 
proceedings which are lengthy, and subject civil suits  challenging the process63. Kabau adds, by 
stating that such civil suits constitute of constitutional petitions on violations of individuals rights 
caused by the enforcement measures against the offence money laundering64. This study intends 
to establish the impact of such challenges in the process of asset recovery via the POCAMLA and 
the implications of petitions filed to oppose the process. 
2.3.2. Use of Predicate Offences 
Predicate offences are those which bring about the offence of money laundering. The position in 
the USA is that such offences are thought crucial in tracing illicit  proceeds65. In the UK, the 
position is the use of circumstantial evidence that gives rise to the irresistible inference that the 
property could only be derived from a criminal source66. These offences may be described by 
reference to all offences, or to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences67. Both 
approaches present their unique challenges especially when it comes to the financial crimes 
perpetrated by banks, in relation to illicit proceeds. The study aims to investigate which challenges 
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62 Anusha A and Aspalella A, ‘Money laundering and civil forfeiture regime: Malaysian experience,’ 19 Journal of 
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assault on corruption,’1 Africa Journal of Comparative Constitutional Law, 2016. 
65 Bell R, ‘Abolishing the concept of predicate offence,’6 Journal of Money laundering Control 2, 2002. 
66Murray K, ‘In the shadow of the dark twin – proving criminality in money laundering cases  
67  International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation, 2019. 
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are faced by adopting the UK approach in Kenya, and the prosecution of such offences by banks, 
more so if they have had an impact in curtailing money laundering. 
2.3.3. Investigations 
Investigations are conducted where a suspicious transaction has been relayed to the relevant 
authority. The aim is to track the source of the illicit proceeds and build a prosecution case. Some 
challenges however exist in the process. For instance, the DPPs annual report acknowledges that 
some of the reasons why economic crime cases in Kenya are found to be inadmissible in court is 
partly linked to outdated technology used in both investigation and prosecution. This also causes 
the loss of crucial evidence that may be used in court68. Such outdated techniques create limitations 
in building cases on money laundering because criminals use more advanced technology in 
committing the offence. Similarly, poor investigation techniques, lack of adequate resources and 
lack of qualified personnel, also lead to loss of important evidence. 
Several scholars have also offered some convincing reasons why investigation techniques against 
money laundering seem not to be efficient. Stefan for example observes that investigations of illicit 
transactions has been presumably done by tracing the three stages in which criminal proceeds are 
laundered; these include placement, layering and integration. For that reason, she argues that the 
assumption is wrong, and investigators should not fixedly align themselves to that process. She is 
convinced that process is outdated because not all criminals will follow the order as it is especially 
in this modern age. She thus advocates for new initiatives in ensuring successful investigation69.  
It may be true that the three stages are outmoded, but they provide a step by step basis of tracking 
illicit money. Reasonably law enforcers should device ways of expounding the model. As Murray 
posits, verifying that the money is illegal is increasingly a difficult task which requires backdated 
approach by the investigators in tracing the source illicit of the funds. He adds that the technology 
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used by investigators should be very efficient carrying out investigations, because criminals 
generate breakdowns or substitute money to hide its original source70.  
The stages would therefore be important in assisting investigators to connect different crimes that 
led to the process of laundering illicit money. Lowe notes that failure only creeps if law enforcers 
entertain reactive probes, which consequently do not provide sufficient evidence that may sustain 
a money laundering case in court. He adds that this causes nothing much to be accomplished due 
to the possibility of generating errors in the process of gathering evidence, and hence failure 
building a solid case71. 
In some cases, qualified personnel who may not be familiar with modern trends of investigations, 
technology can pose continued difficulties for law enforcement agencies. This is true even if they 
have modern tools at their disposal72. The consequence of this is that it creates the need to hire 
experts, which would require additional expenses. For instance, Zolkalfill notes that investigation 
into money that has been laundered proceeds requires the examination of financial statements and 
records73. Therefore, financial experts such as independent auditors may be hired where the 
investigators are not versed in the knowledge of carrying out such financial investigation. 
Bell agrees with the above argument and according to him, investigating illicit proceeds 
transactions will therefore require adequate resources. He adds that this is inevitable also due to 
the need of expert evidence during trials, which comes with the extra costs for their services74. 
Where the government does not ensure the agencies are well funded to support their work, 
investigation becomes problematic due to the high costs involved in conducting them. 
Furthermore, the use of circumstantial evidence is mostly preferred in money laundering 
investigations. This position given by Bell who argues that prosecutions will usually be based on 
this type of evidence, especially if the transactions were so complex, hence it is problematic to 
connect the underlying offences to it75. Since circumstantial evidence depends on pieces of 
evidence linked together to demonstrate that the offence was committed, it may not be strong to 
secure a possible conviction as opposed to direct evidence. 
On occasions where money laundering is considered to be a standalone offence, prosecutors may 
not require to prove that the criminal proceeds are of a particular criminal conduct76. This then 
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questions if there is need to investigate the underlying offences that led to the crime. Murray posits 
that, a typical investigation into the source of illicit proceeds starts with financial records. This 
means that investigations begin after a specific offence initially occurred. It is therefore impossible 
to ignore predicates that led to the crime being committed in the first place77. 
The current study will thus examine the steps taken to investigate money that has be laundered as 
per the legal framework, and challenges faced in the process.  
2.3.4. Prosecution 
Prosecution under the AML regime ensures those found culpable are taken through the court 
process and convicted if found guilty for their offences. The process aims to prove the guilt of the 
persons or corporate institutions who are suspected of having committed the offence. 
The process is nonetheless dependent on discretionary powers granted to the different law 
enforcement agents. These discretionary can be exercised by various officials while carrying out 
their roles. It allows them to make decisions based on their judgement but in line with legal 
provisions of the law78. Such officials in Kenya include the Attorney General, the DPP and judicial 
officers such as magistrates and judges, among others. 
When they exercise these powers, they will respond to legal issues without external influence but 
will rely on the law79. Depending on how such powers are exercised, it results in different outcomes 
on the way cases will be determined, pursued for prosecution or even investigation. Additionally, 
in some situations external influence can also have an impact on these powers. 
For instance, in Kenya prosecutorial discretion is linked to nolle prosequi powers, given by the 
law to DPP. This enables him to either discontinue or pursue the prosecution of any case referred 
to his office80. Where the DPP decides not to continue with any criminal case referred to him, he 
can decide to settle the matter out of court or enter into a plea bargain agreement. Consequently, 
the accused may only be required to pay a fine that will be agreed on, where the case does not 
proceed to conclusion. This can be the case for banks found to have facilitated the transfer of illicit 
proceeds. 
On certain occasions, prosecutors may decide not pursue a criminal case against bank in the normal 
exercise of their discretion. External factors can nonetheless have an influence on this, such as 
possible reputational damage that can be incurred by a bank, which may cause it to lose business 
or goodwill. However, in Kenya, banking institutions are governed by the Banking Act81. 
Moreover, since they are also corporate bodies, they are as well governed by the Companies Act82 
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which gives various provisions on the possible offences chargeable against corporate bodies, their 
directors, and other individuals working on their behalf. Therefore, if the DDP settles a case out 
of court, it does not mean that individuals who facilitated or committed the offence cannot be 
prosecuted. Accordingly, if banks as corporate bodies will not face criminal prosecution or 
conviction, individual bank officials can if found guilty of any money laundering offence they 
have committed. The POCAMLA also gives similar provisions. 
In other jurisdictions like the USA, the concept of corporate criminality is acknowledged and, as 
a result banks can be convicted for criminal offences. And more so, Geslevieh, indicates that 
prosecutors in the USA, in most cases, have nonetheless refrained from this because of the banking 
institution dependency on leveraged income. He adds that they have to weigh the probability of 
causing collateral damage such as systemic risk versus the duty to ensure the enforcement of the 
law through prosecution83. 
He further explains that certain arrangements, such as out of court settlements can be made by 
prosecutors formally through applications to court where the banks and the officials are fined 
instead, and the case is resolved. He has consequently observed that if such arrangements are made, 
there may be no legal action taken against the banks, and there is the possibility of not prosecuting  
the banking officials involved in the offence84. 
As alluded to earlier, the DPP in Kenya through nolle prosequi powers can also exercise a similar 
discretion, by making an application to court either orally or in writing, that he has decided against 
not proceeding with an entire case or a part of it. In such occasions a plea arrangement can be 
entered into, and the matter can be settled out of court85. This may also apply to cases involving 
illicit transfer of money by banks.  
Furthermore, where discretionary powers are exercised by judicial officers in courts, the judges 
can review either acts or omissions made by fellow law enforcement agents in implementation of 
the law. Dale and Jeane argue that, if any official or public agent fails to act by  the statute, their 
actions and decisions can be challenged in court86. For that reason, if law enforcement agencies 
are implementing the POCAMLA provisions but do not adhere to other laws that validate any of 
the actions taken, courts may interfere by quashing the actions taken, even if done in good faith.  
Where agents charged with the investigations exercise the same power, and choose to only pursue 
predicate offences, there is reduction in the number of actual money laundering cases brought to 
court. This is the observation made by Maylam who argues that in the United Kingdom (UK), 
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where the prosecutor chooses to prefer a predicate offence and not include money laundering, then 
the result is fewer prosecutions of the offence87. The situation is also similar if they prefer to pursue 
money laundering as a standalone offence, which means predicate offences may be ignored88. 
The study will explore the effects of discretionary used by different public officials including the 
DPP concerning the offences relating to money laundering. It will also attempt to highlight 
instances where it has been used for crimes other than of money laundering; and the impact of out 
of court settlements in fighting the crime in Kenya. 
2.3.5 Access to Information 
Access to information is a right provided by the constitution of Kenya89. Today, information on 
different aspects of the law is readily available on different platforms. Additionally, the 
government has ensured that AML laws are easily accessible on online platforms to the public90. 
The public also includes money launderers who are also very aware of these rules and will 
therefore be at a better position in manipulating schemes to by-pass them91. 
Accordingly, Tuner is in agreement with the above statement, and attributes it to the modernisation 
of the global society. Consequently the law enforcers have a hard task of dealing with lawbreakers 
who are versed and advanced in hiding their trails, therefore making the tracking of illicit moneys 
more difficult 92. 
Likewise, access to information by law enforcement agents is vital. Any findings from the 
investigations should easily be obtained by each agent, who should make that information easily 
accessible to other agents involved, as Sharman and Chaikin indicate93. This can enhance the 
success of AML enforcement. Where such information is not easily accessible, the enforcement 
process becomes slow compared to the speed with which illicit proceeds are disguised to appear 
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legitimate94. The study will therefore seek to examine whether the above situations have occurred 
in Kenya or not. 
2.3.6. Advancements in Banking Technology 
Technological advancements have made challenging for banking institutions to at times verify the 
customers they are dealing with in certain instances. This relatively attributed to financial 
innovations banking sector. Morris-Cotteril argues that innovations in the financial sector, such as 
the use of monetary instruments has allowed money launderers to change, transfer, or hide the 
money that they hold in bank accounts without being detected95.  
The same argument is advanced by Tuner who agrees that technological advancements have also 
transformed ways of laundering money, hence restraining and significantly reducing the likelihood 
of detection. In their view, internet banking has eliminated need of over the counter transactions, 
and, therefore, allowing transactions to occur at a fast pace before law enforcers discover them96. 
Merlonghi similarly adds that, the conversion of money into a digital form may not essentially 
need the use of a bank, but rather a telephone service provider. This then creates instances of 
anonymity and the consequent concealing of the identities of criminals involved97. 
In such situations due diligence analysis is undermined by the difficulty in identifying everyone 
involved in the transaction. Technology has therefore blurred the possibility of banks gathering 
truthful information about customers, thus creating prime avenues for untraceable financial 
transactions98.  
2.3.7. Rogue Officials in the Banking Sector  
The fact that money laundering has become rampant in Kenya can also be partially attributed to 
rogue officials who may assist criminals in facilitating the offence. As Warutere points out, rogue 
banking officials have to infiltrated the market, by creating avenues for illicit transfer of proceeds 
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of crime. He alludes to classical corruption scandals in Kenya, where corrupt officials in the 
banking industry have aided in the laundering of illicit proceeds99. 
Nelsol also adds that, rogue officials include senior managing officials who by indulging in willful 
blindness, can encourage the crime. Alternatively, he further states, management may well chose 
to facade reports of internal controls against money laundering, to show compliance, whereas they 
are not100. A case in point was Dubai bank in Kenya which was ultimately liquidated due to non-
compliance of various banking regulations, and the publication of fraudulent reports ,which hid 
various criminal activities carried out by senior management101. 
In the same vein, consequently Konstadin and Pusara posit that the above scenarios can bring about 
circumstances of institutional collaboration between banking officials and members of a criminal 
organisation; therefore building a firm ground where the crime thrives in of exchange of monetary 
compensation102. Margaret103 affirms this by indicating that business corporations such as banks, 
can support illicit enterprises and be mutually supported by them. She gives various reasons 
attributable to these partnerships, such as greed and corruption. She however notes that sometimes 
legitimate businesses can opt to facilitate criminal transactions by their own will. 
2.3.8. Multi-Agency Collaborations 
Where different institutions partner to fight a crime, the approach can be termed as multi agency. 
The multi-agency approach is a similar method used in Kenya fight money laundering. 
Partnerships with the following government agencies ; the National Police Service, Directorate of 
Criminal Investigation, the DPP, ARA, KRA, FRC and CBK have been established to curb the 
crime104.  
Schneider and Hurt observe that this approach incorporates different agents who join efforts in 
combating a crime. They add that the different agents can emanate from criminal enforcement, 
regulatory institutions and administrative bodies. They further note that this technique has been 
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perceived as ideal globally to fight organised crime such as money laundering, but it is also faced 
with a lot of shortcomings. These range from the legal provisions in the different statues giving 
the agents different mandates, the lack of resources, the safeguarded nature of findings after 
investigations, alleged views of corruption in the agencies and competition amongst them. All this 
may then cause the agencies to be disjunctive in the manner in which they are to carry out their 
duties105.  
The above study correlates with the findings of Turner, who also cites the challenge of 
communication overlaps where different agents are used in enforcement of law. They observe that 
the process of gathering adequate and reliable data is key in enforcement of the law. According to 
them, impediments are likely to be drawn in when information stems from different sources106. 
According to them ,this leads to the watering down of information, which may then not assist in 
the analytical process of investigating money107. 
The current study will seek to examine different laws that have mandated various government 
agents to fight the crime and try to address potential areas of conflict in Kenya. 
2.3.9. Law Suits for Breach of Banker - Customer Relationships 
The banker-customer relationship is contractual according to Hudson. For him, this therefore 
makes the relationship hence fiduciary. For that reason, bankers then have to comply with the 
execution of their customers’ instructions such as making payments, and honoring cheques. 
Refusal to do so may lead to a legal action against the bank108.  
As earlier discussed banks are supposed to comply with reporting obligations, and where their 
transactions create any form of suspicion, be it legitimate or not, the accounts may be frozen after 
court order, in certain cases to facilitate investigations. Such instances have at times caused banks 
to be sued even if they did so in compliance with court orders. Furthermore, there are 
circumstances where customers have also filed constitutional petitions to review the validity of the 
warrants issued to investigate the accounts. This occurs especially when such actions taken by 
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banks, in obedience to the law cause any form of inconvenience to their customers, particularly 
where the investigations are not done expeditiously.  
This study will therefore attempt to highlight challenges faced by the banks where banks in Kenya 
in a bid to comply with the law by making reports of suspicious transactions, and examine some 
instances where such reports are made in good faith have caused banks to be sued. 
2.3.10. Corruption  
Corruption can be described as a mechanism which favors or facilitates the commission of other 
criminal activities in any institution109. Muragura observes that money laundering and corruption 
are so intertwined, because corruption may give rise to the money laundering offence. He further 
argues that the reason could be that because most AML regimes were not specifically designed to 
curb corruption that is related to it110. However, AML regulations acknowledge the existence of 
predicate offences. Corruption has hence been presumed to be part of those offences in Kenya. It 
therefore falls under the category of offences that can be pursued under the AML regime  
Aketch notes that corruption can be attributable institutional problems in any organization. This is 
regardless of it being a public or a private institution. He adds, Kenya has however been lenient in 
prosecuting corrupt officials or institutions111. As a result, the offence has been tolerated, and is 
widely practiced in the country. This includes some banks and their employees can also engage in 
corrupt conducts. This same observation made by Solaiman112 who indicates that, if corrupt 
persons are treated like trivial offenders of the law, there is an implied notion of tolerance towards 
the offence by law enforcers to the general public, which ultimately breeds grounds for the 
commission of other crimes. 
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Lukito points out that in certain instances, banks have been accused of failing to reveal money 
laundering offences if for example bribery has been used to facilitate an illicit transaction113. 
Zali and Maulidi further reaffirm that enforcement of AML laws becomes difficult if corrupt 
conspiracies exist between criminals and banking institutions. They state that this makes the 
detection of the crime almost impossible, because the accomplices can easily fabricate any 
evidence indicating their transactions. Therefore, threat of detection is reduced and criminals are 
shielded from the law enforcement agencies114, regardless of banks implementing internal control 
measures to curtail illicit transactions. 
2.4. Conclusion 
From the examined literature, there is a clear indication that enforcement of AML regime has put 
various measures to curb the offence of money laundering. These range from the preventive 
measures conducted by banks, to the law enforcement mechanisms by the different law 
enforcement agents who facilitate the investigation or prosecution of the offence. It is also evident 
that for these measures to work banks should work together with the law enforcement agents to 
ensure criminals do not succeed in the transmission of illicit proceeds through them. 
However, where there are deliberate violations of the preventive measures, coupled with other 
challenges in the enforcement process, there is difficulty in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
process. This therefore causes the enforcement practices to fail, even if there is commitment to 
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Chapter Three: Review of the Laws and Regulation Governing Money 
Laundering in Kenya  
3.0. Introduction 
This section will analyse different laws that pertain to curbing the offence of money laundering 
and its predicate offences. These laws include the Constitution of Kenya (2010); the Proceeds of 
Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No 9 of 2009); the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission Act (No 22 of 2011), (ACECA); the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (No 
3 of 2003); the Banking Act, 2015, the Central Bank of Kenya cap 491; some provisions from the 
Prudential Guidelines 2013 and the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations, 
2013 and some provisions form the Financial Action Taskforce(FATF) 40+9 Recommendations. 
Particular attention will be given to sections aimed at enforcement money laundering, and their 
impact on banking institutions. Emphasis will be limited to the statutory bodies and agencies 
established to fight the crime. The FATF 40+ 9 recommendations were chosen as opposed to other 
conventions that fight money laundering due their relevance in shaping the POCAMLA.  
3.1. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 
The Constitution is the supreme law of Kenya and binds every individual and state organ, to act 
following its provisions115. It further prescribes certain national values and principles which should 
be adhered to in whatever acts that individuals or state organs decide to pursue under article 
10.These principles include; good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability116. 
therefore, banks and law enforcement agents are required to observe these principles, as they 
prevent and enforce the rules and laws against money laundering. 
3.2. The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009) 
The POCAMLA, was legislated to outlaw the offences involving money laundering ,and hence, to 
bring about ways of fighting the offence, such as identifying, tracing, freezing, and confiscating 
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criminal proceeds117. These methods are aimed at curtailing the different stages which money 
laundering takes place as described in the Prudential Guidelines under section 3118. 
The stages as per the guidelines include: placement of the initial proceeds resulting from an illegal 
activity in the financial institution; layering which hides the source of the money through complex 
transactions intended to mask the audit trail of investigators and create anonymity; and finally 
integration by making the laundered funds proceed back into the society making it appear to be a 
normal day to day business transaction. These convoluted processes then bring the offence of 
money laundering. Consequently, ‘money laundering’ can be defined as transactions aimed to hide 
the source or characteristics of the of the illicit proceeds119. These transactions can be done in 
Kenya or any other jurisdiction. 
3.2.1. Money Laundering Sanctions  
The Act has provisions for various sanctions corresponding to different offences of money 
laundering. The ultimate aim of the sanctions under the POCAMLA, are to deprive banks from 
any gains obtained by breaching its provisions. Some of the offences and corresponding penalties 
established by section 16 of the Act are: 
Upon conviction a corporate institution is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty five million 
shillings, or the amount of the value of the property involved in the offence120. This is for 
committing money laundering by financial transmission or acquiring and using proceeds of 
crime121. Further Section 16(2) states: failure to report suspicious transactions; tipping off reports 
to be sent to the FRC; failure to monitor and report transactions whether suspicious or usual 
regularly; failure to establish the identities of customers, or maintaining customer records, warrants 
a fine not exceeding ten million shillings or the amount of the value of the property involved in 
the offence, whichever is the higher122. Additionally if an institution fails to report the conveyance 
of a financial instrument, they attract a financial penalty not exceeding ten per cent of the amount 
of that financial instruments123. 
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The punitive nature of these sanctions against banks, if executed aims at encouraging compliance. 
Yusuf and Ekundayo adds that, sanctions also encourage discipline and discourage possible 
repeated violations of the law124. Unfortunately, it has not been clear if hefty financial fines can 
inculcate such culture in banks. This is because they are corporate business entities, whose aim is 
to make profit from certain transactions. DiLorenzo argues that such fines will only cause a 
recidivist behavior for corporate institutions such as banks, for various offences they opt to 
violate125. This is done specifically in situations where criminal acts bear gains which outweigh 
the financial penalties. 
3.2.2. The proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Regulations 
These regulations were issued by the Finance Minister, to expound on the AML obligations by 
reporting institutions including banks. Section 10 states that reporting institutions such as banks 
should employ or appoint a Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLRO). The task of such 
officers would be to work in the management position of the institution, and other junior employees 
are required report and file STRs with them. The regulations only state that these officers are 
supposed to have the necessary competencies126, but is silent on what such competency entails.  
Kayuni argues that the clear presentation of qualifications for certain positions required by the law 
is very important, in ensuring the right candidates get the job127. This is important for proper the 
enforcement of the AML regime in banks. The absence of indicating such required qualifications 
for that position, may lead to the employment of individuals who are not aware of the weight of 
their duties. Consequently, internal preventive measures fail as result which can be partly 
connected this gap in the law. It does not properly guide banking institutions on the appropriate 
skills, qualifications and experience required for the position.  
Section 10(4) recognises MLRO as the designated officials to file the STRs to the FRC, which 
should be done without delays. However, the regulation prescribes other additional duties128 such 
as applying internal risk management procedures on suspicious transactions; training employees 
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the requirements of the POCAMLA and working together the human resource department to 
ensure the screening of persons intended to hired as employees. 
From the above duties, the role of an MLRO seems to be involving, and where banks assign then 
other roles besides those prescribed by the law, there is the possibility of them being overworked. 
The Financial Conduct Authority in the UK, has observed that if the senior management 
overburdens the MLRO with other tasks not related to ensuring the efficacy of internal control 
measures, such measures will not work efficiently129. This happens where they work in other 
departments within the bank, and hence cannot give keen attention to their work by performing 
those duties. 
The screening of employees by the MLRO as provided by the regulation is aimed at preventing 
the infiltration of banking sector with rogue employees. However, the regulations do not go further 
to explain what that process may entail. It left to the discretion of the MLRO and the human 
resource department, which may not be effective. If the law laid down the required standards, it 
can prevent such instances from occurring. Kayuni argues that where the law is silent on such 
interpretations, the provision remains open to different perceptions of banks130. It may not be 
effective to prevent the financial sector from criminal infiltration. 
Section 22 mandates banks to carry out special risk management processes if they transact with 
politically exposed persons131. In such cases, employees are required to obtain the approval of the 
senior officials if they establish that they are dealing with such clients. Consequently, they are 
mandated take extra care to identify the origin of their wealth. The question that can arise from 
this provision is what happens if the banks belongs to politicians or the politically exposed 
persons? There might be unreliable due diligence measures applied on such occasions. 
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Daniela argues that it has be reported on certain occasions, business entities owned by politicians 
or politically exposed persons, could be the main conduits for concealing illicit proceeds of crime 
belonging to corrupt public officials132. 
3.3. Predicate Offences  
Section 2 of the Anti -Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No 3 of 2003) Act states that, 
corruption is an economic crime which entail fraud, bribery, and conspiracies to commit either 
offences133. These offences can form part of the principal offences that facilitate the laundering of 
money in the banking sector. This inference is drawn from section 2 of the POCAMLA which 
defines criminal proceeds as, 
‘properties or economic advantages derived or realized, directly or indirectly, as a result of or in 
connection with an offence (…) later successively converted, transformed or intermingled, as well 
as income, capital or other economic gains or benefits derived or realized from such property from 
the time the offence was committed.’134 Therefore, corruption offences can bring about proceeds 
of crime. 
Corruption can then involve both public organizations and private entities. Banks fall under the 
category of private entities. Under section 38, agents in the public or private sectors and similar 
institutions, can be held liable for corrupt conduct. These agents may be rogue banking officials 
or banks that are susceptible to the said wrongdoings. Additionally, the challenge posed by corrupt 
offences linked to money laundering is their late detection. This is attributed to the complexity of 
corrupt offences. Consequently, there is delay in detecting the crime in a well-timed manner  
allowing corrupt institutions to bypass the law135. 
3.4. The Banking Act, 2015 
The Act gives various provisions on the conduct of the banking business in Kenya and some 
offences which banks may be prone to. It further gives detailed information on the CBK role as 
                                                          
132 Daniele C, ‘Politically exposed entities: how to tailor PEP requirements to PEP owned legal entities, 22 Journal 
of Money Laundering Control, 2, 2019,359-372. 
133Section 47A, Anti -Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (Act No 3 of 2003). 
134Section 2, Proceeds of Crime and Anti –Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
135Pavlovic, Z and Paunovic N, ‘Corruption criminal offenses as predicate economic crimes to money laundering,’ 
Journal of Eastern-European Criminal Law,2, 2019, 223-231. 
35 
  
the main supervisory body to banks. In Section 32(4) the CBK can assist other investigative 
agencies in matters related to suspected fraud or malfeasance by banking institutions. This can be 
done at the request of other law enforcement agencies or on its discretion. Such malfeasance on 
the part of supervised banks can be related to money laundering offences. Similarly the CBK, as 
coordinator of joint supervision, done by other regulatory bodies, can appoint any of them to 
conduct investigations on any offences committed by banks136. 
3.5. The Institutions mandated to Fight Money Laundering, their roles and Challenges Faced 
in the Different Enforcement methods used against Money Laundering 
3.5.1 The Central Bank  
The CBK is established under section 3 of the Central Bank Act. It is the main supervisory body 
to banks. Section 33F (1) of the Act indicates that the CBK is mandated to carry out regular 
inspections of banking records. This is to ensure banks comply with the law. Where such 
inspections are done, banks are supposed to avail all books and records of accounts. If after the 
inspection the CBK has reason to believe that the inspected bank is being operated in contrary to 
its requirements, it can give guidance on the conduct of business137. 
These records include customer records as mandated by the POCAMLA138. This CBK role a is 
similar to some of the tasks carried out by the FRC, where officers and employees of banking 
institutions are required to avail all the books, accounts and other documents that will provide 
information concerning their conduct of business139.  
Where the CBK finds that the bank is being conducted in a way that conflicts with its legal 
requirements, it can issue recommendations to remedy the situation, and improvement its 
management140. In connection with the prevention of illicit transactions, such recommendations or 
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guidance are issued through guidance notes141or guidelines142. They contain detailed requirements 
on various measures that banks are to implement. 
3.5.2. The Financial Reporting Center (FRC) 
Section 21 of the POCAMLA establishes the FRC. It is a corporate body. Consequently, it is tasked 
with the duties of receiving, analysing and interpreting financial reports relating to money 
transactions or transmissions143. These reports concern suspicious monetary transactions. Once the 
reports are received the center is mandated to evaluate the reports by carrying out investigations144. 
The investigations are done to establish if the suspicious transactions can be connected to money 
laundering. Afterwards, the evidence gathered is disseminated to law enforcement agencies for 
appropriate action145. Unfortunately, there is no documentation readily available on their website 
as of to date146, informing the public about appropriate actions taken after reports are made. This 
has created the absence of a results-based feedback from the FRC 
Section 38 of the POCAMLA indicates that the center can only go as far as obtaining monitoring 
orders to allow it to trace illicit proceeds, hence cannot confiscate them after it is done tracking. 
Consequently, it cannot implement some judicial remedies provided in the POCAMLA, when it 
finds banks in violation of it. Such remedies include preservation orders for the confiscation of the 
illicit proceeds.  
The model adopted by the center in carrying out its function is administrative. For that reason, it 
has powers under section 24C to enforce administrative penalties. These include warnings, orders 
requiring compliance, cancellation or suspension of licenses and orders barring the offenders from 
employment temporarily or permanently147. But the law through the Proceeds of Crime and Anti 
Money Laundering Amendment Act, 2017, section 4, additionally gave it elaborate powers under 
section 24B of the POCAMLA, to execute financial penalties to both individuals and corporate 
bodies, when they do not act in accordance with any of its requirements set under the law. These 
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142The Prudential Guidelines, 2013. 
143Section 24(a)(i) and (ii) Proceeds of Crime and Anti- Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
144Section 24(c), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
145Section 24(b), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
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amounts go up to the tune five million shillings for individuals, and twenty-five million shillings 
for corporate bodies such as banks.  
In line with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)148, recommendation 35, these sanctions are 
meant to be dissuasive and proportionate. Morogo observes that the above financial sanctions, may 
be exaggerated, due to the high deterrent value. He further states that it may not be plausible for 
effective regulation, because in as much as banks ought to cooperate with the FRC, they will be 
effective only in creating fear and encouraging protective tick-box compliance by banks, to its 
requirements149.  
Consequently, banking institutions will then tend to employ self-protective compliance, where 
they excessively make reports, to paint the picture of actual compliance. Resultantly, the FRC only 
then gathers unreliable data which may not assist at all in investigations aimed at building cases 
that may be referred for prosecution.  
POCAMLA does not also prescribe the limit for an investigative agency, after receiving STRs, to 
conduct and finalise the investigations and give feedback to the FRC. Similarly, it does not give 
the time limit for the DPP, having received the relevant evidence, to undertake the necessary 
measure. This may be the reason behind lengthy investigative periods, which may not be effective 
in enforcement of AML laws. 
3.5.3. The Assets Recovery Agency  
ARA is established under section 53(1) of the POCAMLA. It has the power to carry out criminal 
and civil confiscation of illicit proceeds150 to deprive criminals of the benefits resulting from their 
criminal activities. The difference between civil and criminal forfeiture, in the recovery of illicit 
assets, is that criminal forfeiture enables the ARA to secure the confiscation of the recovered 
assets; initiate the prosecution of the suspect via criminal proceedings; and sustain a conviction 
depending on evidence.  
                                                          
148International standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism & proliferation, FATF, 
recommendations,2012,https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recomme
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Laundering Act, unpublished LLM thesis, University of Western Cape, South Africa, 2017. 
150Section 54(1), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
38 
  
Civil forfeiture on the other hand does not require a conviction of the suspect, or the initiation of 
proceedings against them. Their absence does not affect confiscation orders issued by the court151. 
Civil confiscation orders only require proof that the property was either used, or was intended to 
be used in the facilitation of a crime152. Consequently, its proceedings are not conviction-based 
since the action is against the property. The aim is to recover assets obtained criminally in the 
absence of a criminal conviction or on occasions where the evidence is insufficient, and the 
suspected criminal is cannot be found or is dead153. 
The reasons why the law allows this, is to moderate the high standards of proof required in criminal 
law, where a case has to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. These are the same opinions of both 
Aurasu and Rahman, who add that this allows ease in confiscation of illicit proceeds154. The law 
in Kenya assumes this standard in section 56 of the POCAMLA, thereby allowing criminal 
confiscation orders to apply civil procedure rules in its proceedings.  
The impediment that could occur in obtaining confiscation orders, is if civil forfeiture is used in 
circumstances, where criminal forfeiture could be appropriate. This is in a situation where suspects 
are known, but law enforcers do not pursue them. Such instances occur, and according to Stefan 
law enforcers become negligent, if the custody of illicit proceeds is done under civil forfeiture 
orders, to avoid investigation to determine true owners of the illicit money. She notes that in such 
circumstances, law enforces fail because where suspects are known, it is possible to institute 
criminal proceedings155.  
Nevertheless, whichever mechanism is used, banks and other law enforcement agencies are 
mandated to cooperate with the ARA when it comes to the implementation of the confiscation 
orders156. Such cooperation will entail obedience to the orders made by freezing the suspects’ 
accounts, to allow the seizure of moneys deposited therein. Jonah notes that, the main challenge is 
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153Transparency International, ‘Combating money laundering and recovering looted gains: raising the UK’s game, 
May 2012, 
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ensuring that the rights of individuals are respected in the process157. If the orders are obtained 
without substantial evidence, there are possibilities of them being challenged by individuals in 
court. This is through applications to have the orders quashed. 
After the accounts are frozen, the ARA is then mandated to carry out their investigations within a 
reasonable time. If the time used in doing so is unreasonable, or prolonged without good reasons, 
then it breeds ground for numerous ligations against banks and the law enforcement agencies for 
breach of various rights under the Constitution158. This is acknowledged by the Office of the 
Director of Public Prosecution (ODPP) in its annual report for 2017 which states that if 
constitutional rights are breached in the process of implementing the law, suits are likely to be 
filed by the affected parties159. Ultimately this may cause investigations to drag, as law enforcers 
await the outcomes of the court decisions challenging their actions. 
Additionally, the time frame provided for the implementation of civil forfeiture orders by the ARA 
lengthy. This may defeat the purpose of those orders. Section 92(5) specifies, that after the order 
is made, the Registrar of the High Court has to publish a notice of not more than thirty days. 
Section 92 (6) further indicates the order will not take effect before applications to vary or retract 
the orders, have been heard160, or appeals under section 92(6) for the exclusion of interests have 
been concluded. 
The other challenge resulting from this lengthy process, is the possibility of suspects being tipped 
off concerning the oncoming investigations being initiated, and may therefore find ways of 
escaping justice.  
Furthermore, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has observed that delays 
caused by the legal process of obtaining forfeiture orders in Kenya can drag down the process of 
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158The Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
159Annual Anti-Corruption report by the director of public prosecutions in respect of prosecution of anti-corruption 
and economic Crime related cases, pursuant to the provisions of section 37 of the Anti-Corruption and Economic 
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recovering criminal proceeds, subsequently causing delay in the administration of justice. This is 
especially in situations where legal action ought to be taken immediately161.  
3.5.4. The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions  
The ODPP is established under article 157(1) of the Constitution. The core duty of this office is to 
charge and prosecute cases dispatched by investigative agencies162. Under article 157(4), the DPP 
has power to instruct other law enforcement agents, such as the Inspector-General of the National 
Police Service to investigate any information or allegation of criminal conduct. From this 
provision, it is evident that the police will be also be involved in investigations pertaining to money 
laundering offence. 
Article 157(6) further allows the DPP to commence criminal court action against any person163; 
take up any criminal matter that was already instituted in court by any person with their 
permission164; or bring the proceedings to an halt at any stage before judgment is delivered165. 
These powers under article 157(9) can also be exercised by subsidiary officers, following his 
instructions. Under article 157(10) the DPP will not require the permission of any official or 
institution to begin any criminal proceedings. This article introduces the concept of prosecutorial 
discretion. Where the DPP exercises such discretion, out of court settlements can be entered into 
at, at any stage of the trial. The effect is that some case may be concluded without having to go 
through a criminal trial166.  
3.5.5. The Office of the Attorney General 
The Attorney-General’s office has the authority to also direct order investigations on money 
laundering. This authority is given to him by section 122 of the POCAMLA, if he suspects that 
any person has possession of information relating to offences of money laundering. This can be 
done before any civil or criminal proceedings are initiated. Similarly, discretionary powers to 
                                                          
161Country review report of Kenya by United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/CountryVisitFinalReports/2015_09_28_Kenya_Final_Country_
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163Article 157(a), Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
164Article 157(b), Constitution of Kenya, (2010). 
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either continue or discontinue with investigations are also given to the Attorney General in the 
ACECA. the act states: 
 ‘The Commission may, in consultation with the Minister and the Attorney General, tender an 
undertaking in a form prescribed by the Minister, not to institute or continue with investigations 
against any person suspected of an offence under this Act’.167 
However, the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) reports that the above 
provision may limit the investigative processes that can be initiated by other bodies168. Primarily, 
when it comes to the investigation of predicate offences related to money laundering. 
The Attorney General can also allow out of court settlements. This is through his discretionary 
power, on occasions where accused persons either make full and truthful disclosure of their 
corruption or economic crimes. They may then be required to refund the property to the persons 
affected by their crimes, through the EACC169.  
These discretionary powers given to both the ODPP and the AG are subjective nature. There is 
therefore the possibility of biasness being involved in their application. Nonetheless, there are also 
cases where such power is correctly exercised, but it is still subjected to constitutional reviews and 
petitions, which cause delay in enforcement of cases. 
Despite other agencies being involved in the enforcement of POCAMLA, the power to prosecute 
any of the offences rests with the ODPP. The examined statutes do not give any of the agencies 
the powers to prosecute.  
3.5.6 The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission 
The EACC Act under section 3, provides for it powers to the fight against economic crimes and 
corruption. Criminal proceeds can be derived from corrupt offences. Some of the corruption 
offences form part of predicate offences that bring about money laundering. Consequently, the 
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Commission can commence the investigation of these offences and recommend to the DPP their 
prosecution. These offences are indicated in the ACECA. 
The EACC has a similar role given to ARA under section 55 of the ACECA, which is the recovery 
of assets. They are therefore mandated to commence proceedings in court for the retrieval or 
protection of property that belongs to the public; freeze or confiscate proceeds of corruption, and 
like the FRC implement corrective measures170. The corrective measures are in the form of 
monetary fines, and out of court settlements. 
In line with the above powers, the commission can obtain preservation orders aimed at preventing 
the transfer, or disposal of property suspected to be obtained through corrupt conduct. The orders 
can be in force for up to six months to facilitate investigation171. Noteworthy obstacles faced by 
the ARA, can also be faced by the EACC, where petitions may be filed to challenge the length of 
time by persons whose accounts are frozen, to facilitate investigation of predicate offences linked 
to money laundering. 
The EACC is also required to partner with other state agencies, both local and international, in the 
prevention and investigation of corruption172. In implementing their roles, the ACECA, clearly 
lays down the various offences it can pursue. 
In section 56B, the commission can enter into out of court settlements with accused persons before 
instituting any civil charges against them. The settlements are to be registered in court. This is a 
form of discretionary power that is granted to the EACC. The consequence of this provision is 
possible reduction of causes related to money laundering173 
3.5.7. Cooperation Among the Institutional Agents and Enforcement Challenges  
The examined legal frameworks, do not provide elaborate mechanisms dealing with multi-agency 
frameworks and cooperation. However, from different provisions in the statutes discussed above, 
such partnership can be entered into. This through formal agreements between the different agents. 
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The sole purpose is to assist each other in carrying out different roles in the enforcement of money 
laundering.  
In the POCAMLA section31(3), indicates that FRC can create agreements with other state 
departments or agencies to conduct some of its roles. Similarly, the EACC can establish strategic 
partnerships that can assist it in exercising its functions174.  
The likely benefit derived from such agreements would be pooling of resources, among other 
things. It would also avoid the duplicating efforts in curtailing the crime. Nonetheless the setback 
facing this joint approach in Kenya, as discussed by Nyaga, is the lack of a clear-cut mechanism 
or differentiation of obligations in certain joint operations, leading to overlapping roles175.  
A report176, on the multi-agency taskforce in fighting crimes in the country cites that the absence 
of legal or administrative framework on collaboration amongst agencies, may impede a solid 
involvement by the agencies in carrying out their roles. 
In practical terms some of the roles do overlap. This resultantly constricts how they operate. For 
instance, the EACC and ARA can perform asset recovery after obtaining confiscation orders from 
the high court; and the FRC and CBK can carry out inspections on the financial records of banks, 
in connection with the fight against money laundering. These are potential areas of conflict 
amongst some officials. More so in circumstances where recognition ought to be given for the 
work done or the level of expertise needed.  
Inter-agency cooperation is also undermined in situations where there is also lack of transparency 
on gathered information. The second schedule of the POCAMLA indicates that cash declarations 
of persons transmitting monetary instruments of US $10,000, should be made, at the point of entry 
or exit177. When this is done, the information concerning the declaration is remitted to the FRC178. 
Under section 2, these authorized officers, may be the ARA director, police officers, compliance 
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officers in banking institutions, or any other persons given the authority to do so under the Act179. If 
an appropriation is made by any of them, a receipt is issued accordingly to the person as proof of 
the confiscation180. However, upon confiscation, disclosure and surrender of the said amount is 
communicated the director of the ARA 181 and not the FRC. 
Gikonyo argues where disclosure of the information of any confiscation is made to the ARA, and 
not to the FRC, in the long run will defeat its main role which is to receive and analyse all reports 
of182. Consequently, though such cooperation is provided for in the statute, it may not exist in 
actual practice under certain occasions. 
3.6. International bodies, and Mechanisms Adopted by Kenya to Fight Money 
Laundering  
3.6.1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODOC) 
UNODOC is an international body under the United Nation (UN) mandated to fight illicit 
trafficking of drugs, terrorism, corruption and the prevention of crime183. In partnership with other 
UN bodies it has created model laws to assist its member countries, including Kenya, in setting up 
legislation. These legislations are founded under the FATF Recommendations184. 
These recommendations are of importance to financial institutions, as they lay down the preventive 
measures to be adopted to curb the infiltration of illicit proceeds in them. They also prescribe 
additional law enforcement measures to be adopted by the member countries.   
3.6.2 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40+ 9 Recommendations 
The FATF is a global body that regulates illicit financial behavior. It is mandated to issue  guidance 
in the form of recommendations to its member countries, which are expected to implement the 
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same185. This is done by encouraging the countries to adopt legislative measures which are aimed 
at deterring the offence such establishing financial investigation units; and cooperate fully in 
international law enforcement efforts to combat money laundering186. Most of its 
recommendations are reflected in the POCAMLA. Additionally, the 9 recommendations touch on 
terrorist financing hence providing some broad procedures on how to fight terrorism that has been 
financed by illicit proceeds187.  
The FATF has established eight regional bodies known as the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) 
to help in the promotion of its mandate. Among them is the Eastern and South African Anti Money 
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) of which Kenya is a member. It plays a crucial role in the 
dissemination of FATF recommendations on combating money laundering and financing of 
terrorism188,  and takes the necessary steps to prevent the transmission of illicit proceed among its 
member countries189. The FRC in Kenya is mandated to ensure this done through mutual 
agreements of reciprocity, with the member foreign financial intelligence units190. Unfortunately, 
criminal and terrorist organisations create multi-layered, international schemes to evade 
surveillance. Although Kenya has made efforts with its legislation in compliance with the 
recommendations, much work still needs to be done to prevent money laundering in the banking 
sector.   
3.7. Conclusion 
The legal frameworks that have been presented here provide ways of fighting money laundering. 
However as noted there are loopholes in the legal provision such as delays in obtaining court 
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orders, the lack of trust among enforcement agents and the duplicity in some legal provisions on 
enforcement, tend to make the enforcement process difficult.  
It appears that these deficiencies could be the reasons why banks may choose to engage in 
deliberate violations of the law, by making use of both the legal and regulatory deficiencies.  This 
therefore makes it easier for the gritty money launderers to find ways and means to bypass the 


















Chapter Four:  The Enforcement of Money Laundering Laws by the Kenyan 
Courts  
4.0. Introduction  
This chapter presents the enforcement of the AML regime in Kenya through case law. The selected 
cases are not exhaustive, but they are meant to demonstrate the attempts made by the Kenyan law 
enforcement agents in investigating, prosecuting and confiscating criminal proceeds. Additionally, 
they demonstrate the difficulties faced in the processes of doing so, in the banking sector. 
4.1. Republic v Director of Public Prosecutions and another; Ex Parte Patrick Onyango 
Ogola [2016] eKLR 
This case sought to clarify whether money laundering charges could be considered as a standalone 
offence. The applicants wanted the high court to issue orders of prohibition against the DPP to 
prevent him from instituting charges against them, for laundering money stolen from the National 
Youth Service (NYS). This was until initial charges for theft, against them had been heard and 
determined. The applicants believed that money laundering charges would only be brought against 
them if the theft charges had been proved indubitably.  
The Judge stated that the prosecution of money laundering did not require the proof of a previous 
criminal offence. The basis of his decision was borrowed from established precedents in the UK. 
In decisions made in the cases of Republic v Anwoir191, and Republic v NW and others192. In both 
cases, the Judges held that prosecutors did not need to prove an earlier conviction of predicate 
offences, in order to bring money laundering charges against suspects. Consequently, he held that 
money laundering was a standalone offence and circumstantial evidence is admissible in proving 
it. The possible outcome of the statement made by the Judge could have the effect of undermining 
the use of predicate offences linked to the offences of money laundering.  
‘… I so hold, that the prosecution need not prove, prior to any charges of money laundering, that 
there has existed a conviction or an affirmation of a predicate offence. The prosecution need not 
consequently show a determination by a court of law that there was theft or forgery or fraud that 
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led to the acquisition of the proceeds or property the subject of the money laundering 
proceedings….’193  
A close reading of the POCAMLA under section 2 states that; 
“proceeds of crime means any property or economic advantage derived or realized, directly or 
indirectly, as a result of or in connection with an offence…’ 
It can therefore be argued that the offence of money laundering is linked closely to the commission 
of a scheduled offence. It is argued by the World Bank, in a report on combating money 
laundering194, financial crimes often require the specification of a class of offences that lead to 
money laundering. Consequently, where a prosecutor tables evidence that only shows that a 
transaction appeared unlawful or suspects appeared not to any lawful income, it may not be 
sufficient. 
This is because the offence takes place in different phases, which are all aimed to cover up a 
specific crime. Indicating the predicate offences that led to it can help during detection and 
investigation. It creates an important link to establish how money laundering occurred in the first 
place.  
In money laundering cases, the Prosecution must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
property alleged to have been laundered is, or represents property obtained as a result of, or in 
connection with, criminal conduct195.  
Additionally, in the UK, Murray asserts that, prosecutors have also had difficulties in obtaining 
convictions for money laundering offences, especially where it is not connected to an earlier 
predicate offence. He adds that, where the prosecutor just relies on the existence of some criminal 
activities, without specifying the crime, could relegate the use of predicate offences in bringing 
charges against suspects who may have committed the money laundering offences196. Kenya is 
also not immune to such problems. This might as well occur in future cases due to the custom of 
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borrowing from precedents. It is therefore important for law enforcers to look into predicate 
offences that could have resulted to the offence of money laundering, especially where the crime 
is financial, and underlying offences may give a hint on how it all began in the first place. 
4.2. Manfred Walter Schmitt and another v Attorney General and 3 others [2014] eKLR: 
money laundering investigations and potential breaches of the rights to privacy 
The petitioners, in this case, claimed that their fundamental rights to privacy and ownership of the 
property had been violated by the respondents. Manfred (first petitioner) was the director of 
Sparkyben Limited (the second petitioner), a company he had incorporated in Kenya. He had 
opened four accounts with Diamond Trust Bank, under his name and the company. Afterwards, he 
transferred Kshs 635,000,000, to them, through forty-five different transactions. According to him, 
the money was for investment and business activities. Diamond Trust Bank found this to be 
suspicious, therefore reported to the CBK. 
The Banking Fraud and Investigations Department (BFID) was consequently instructed by the 
CBK to commence investigations. This was aimed at establishing the legality of the transactions. 
As a result, an application was made to court197 to obtain warrants for the seizure and investigation 
of the petitioners’ accounts. The warrants were issued accordingly and they proceeded with the 
investigations. 
The applicants’ filed a first application198 opposing the investigation. The court revised the initial 
orders and declared that the CBK and BFID had no solid grounds to warrant the investigations. 
The BFID was also held to have acted unlawfully hence a violation of the petitioners’ right to 
privacy. Nonetheless, the DPP still directed the BFID to undertake further investigations into the 
petitioners’ accounts to establish the source of the money. 
This led to a second application199 opposing the DPPs’ instruction. The petitioners felt that the 
respondents abused initial court orders, barring them from continuing with the investigations. The 
respondents had infringed the applicant’s fundamental rights to privacy, jointly and severally in 
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violation of the constitution. This was still contrary to the Constitution of Kenya200. Additionally, 
they felt that the bank reported them maliciously to the CBK. 
The judge held that the claim for malicious reporting failed as it was misplaced in the proceedings. 
This is because the bank acted by the Prudential Guidelines. He further also chose to ignore the 
applicability of the POCAMLA, since the application at the initial subordinate court was made 
under the Criminal Procedure Code201. According to him, the search conducted by the BFID 
infringed the petitioners’ privacy rights and arbitrarily deprived them of their property. 
He also stated the respondents acted unlawfully because the second court order had declared the 
warrants invalid. The bank together with the Attorney general was fined, and ordered to pay each 
of the petitioners five hundred thousand shillings as general damages. 
The good judge erred by not considering the applicability of the POCAMLA in determining the 
case. This is the same for the law enforcers when they sought the first orders to investigate the 
applicants’ accounts, which could have then resulted in the failure in terms of law enforcement. 
The banks reported the transactions as suspicious. The mere presence of such transactions allows 
investigations into them under the POCAMLA, by following the right procedures. 
Money laundering by its very nature is a serious crime, hence the investigations ought to have been 
addressed using strong measures. For that reason, there may be circumstances where enforcement 
efforts may clash with individual privacy rights and concerns.  
It is also undeniable that the constitution guarantees every individual with the right to privacy202, 
which also protects them from unwarranted and possession of their property, the non-disclosure of 
their affairs and non-infringement of their communications. However, the same rights are limited 
by section 17 of the POCAMLA which stipulates that its provisions shall take priority over any 
requirement as to secrecy on disclosure of information imposed by any other law. Therefore, where 
persons or individuals acting in accordance with this law, and in good faith, they will not be 
accountable for doing so. Therefore, this right is not absolute, especially when it comes to the 
investigation of money laundering offences. 
                                                          
200Article 31(c), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
201Section 118 to 122, Criminal Procedure Code, 2009. 
202 Article 31, Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
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However, the Law enforcers erred in using illegal search warrants to conduct their investigations, 
this caused the evidence gathered to be inadmissible. In the case of Ivanov v North West Gambling 
Board 203, the judge stated that the correctness of the search and seizure applications depended on 
their legality. Consequently, if a court of law declared that it did not have any legal basis, it meant 
the warrants authorising the exercise were invalid. Therefore, any actions by law enforcement, 
even if done in good faith, becomes unlawful. 
These facts highlight problems encountered in investigations of suspicious monetary transactions. 
They outline how enforcement can be difficult, especially where law enforces conducting unlawful 
searches and not relying on the POCAMLA in carrying out investigations. The consequence of 
their action resulted in the numerous petitions by the claimant opposing their actions. 
The case also illustrates how banks encounter some difficulties in complying with the law. This 
relates to situations where deliberate efforts are made to comply with the law, but suits for 
infringement of various rights under the Constitution are brought against them. Yet reasonably, 
the only way the DPP and the BFID would have uncovered suspicious, would have been through 
access to the petitioners’ financial records. The POCAMLA also states that cash transactions above 
US$ 10,000 ought to be declared and reported whether suspicious or not204. The amount of 
monetary transactions by the petitioners was Kshs 655,000,000 and therefore fell under that 
category. The bank followed the law by making the report. However, the back and forth 
applications to court opposing their investigative process, become an obstacle their efforts. 
4.3. Printwell Industries Limited v Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited [2013] eKLR: 
voluntary violations of the law by banks  
The plaintiff, Printwell industries ltd, lost over two million shillings deposited in a fraudulent 
account by its unsuspected customers. This occurred after the defendants, Barclays bank ltd, 
allowed a sham company to open an account under their name.  
From the facts, the evidence produced by the BFID revealed that there were two separate 
companies; one incorporated under the plaintiff’s name (Printwell Industries Ltd), on 25 July 2006; 
and another using the same name, but incorporated on 4 June 2012. The latter being the sham 
                                                          
203[2012] ZASCA 97. 
204Section 44(6), Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009).  
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company operating a bank account under the plaintiff’s name. The dates show that the sham 
company was incorporated long after the plaintiff original company. This meant that, they would 
have had to confirm where correct payments had to be made, before clearing the cheques to be 
paid to the plaintiffs. 
The defendants argued that they had abided by Prudential Guidelines while opening the disputed 
account. However, willful blindness was clearly exhibited by the bank officials who did not 
conduct proper verification of the sham company’s documents. They also stated that the law did 
not mandate them to verify documents of incorporation. 
The Judge found that the defendant had breached the law by failing to conduct proper due 
diligence, and allowed the issuance of temporary injunction to block the sham account, for 
investigations be conducted by the BFID.  
From the facts, the bank failed in implementing customer due diligence as per section 45(1) of the 
POCAMLA, which mandates reporting institutions including bank to take reasonable measures to 
ascertain the true identity of any person or entity that seeks to enter into a business relationship 
with it. This is done by requiring their customers to produce to produce official records capable of 
establishing their true identity. Such include incorporation documents for companies. 
The aim of this provision is to prevent fraudulent transactions that can promote money laundering 
offences. Furthermore, banks owe their customers a duty of care to prevent fraudulent transactions 
of any manner205.This shields the customers from deceitful acts by agents or dishonest payment 
instructions206. 
A close examination of this application shows negligence on the part of the banks claim of not 
being required to verify incorporation the documents as obviously negligent and false. 
Additionally, the POCAMLA states that evidence of incorporation is a requirement when verifying 
the identity of a company207. Under the Prudential Guidelines 2013, clause 4 on AML obligations 
for institutions states; ‘Institutions (…) are obligated verify customer identity; establish and 
                                                          
205 Karak Brothers Company Ltd v Burden (1972) All ER 1210  
206 Mbaluto J, ‘ Obligated: Examining the Duty of Care in Banking,  https://www.oraro.co.ke/2018/06/27/obligated-
examining-the-duty-of-care-in-banking/ on 17 September, 2020. 
207Section 45(1)(b)(i), Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
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maintain customer record’208. Section 5209 further indicates what is needed for proper customer 
identification and verification. These are dependent on the type of businesses their customers 
conduct. It also mandates banks to verify satisfactorily that it is dealing with a person who exist, 
whether transactions happen once or frequently210. 
Where banks deliberately turn a blind eye to requirements of carrying out proper customer due 
diligence, they fail in implementing the preventing the commission of money laundering and other 
financial crimes.  
4.4. Republic v Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Ex parte Sanjay Shah [2016] eKLR 
The case challenged the existence of a multi-agency taskforce formed to investigate corruption, 
money laundering and tax evasion by Charterhouse Bank. The task force comprised of 
representatives from CBK, KRA, the State Law Office, the Department of Governance and Ethics 
in the Office of the President and the defunct KACC. The said offences were discovered during a 
routine inspection by the CBK. 
The applicant was the former managing director of the bank, who was suspected to have facilitated 
some of the offences. He wanted the court to compel the respondents to produce final report, in 
respect of Charterhouse Bank regarding investigated offences. The investigation had been done by 
KACC, a predecessor of the respondent. A provisional investigation report containing details of 
the findings was leaked erroneously. It implicated the petitioner and the Bank to the offenses 
investigated  
Moreover, he questioned the authority of the inter-agency taskforce, especially the EACC formerly 
KACC in investigating tax related offences, that connected him money laundering. He argued that 
the mandate of the KACC was to enforce laws211 pertaining to ethics and integrity, and not tax or 
banking laws. For that reason, they acted ultra vires. 
The facts of the case shaded light on the challenges faced in multi-agency partnerships. The Police, 
KRA, CBK, EACC and the Criminal Investigations Department are institutional agents mandated 
to curb money laundering offences. Each one of them has been given a different role by its enabling 
                                                          
208Clause 4.2.5, Prudential Gidelines,2013. 
209Clause5.6.2, Prudential Guidelines, 2013. 
210Clause 5.6.3. (a) and (d), Prudential Guidelines, 2013. 
211The Leadership and Integrity Act, and the Public Officers Ethics Act. 
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legislation on what duties they are to perform, but ironically the same statutes can duplicate their 
mandates. It is obvious that offence of tax evasion, could have been properly investigated by KRA 
as opposed to the EACC. However, section 45 (1) (d) of ACECA, allows the EACC to investigate 
offences tax related offences concerning unpaid fees or levies. The consequence of such provisions 
undeniably causes the duplicity of roles by law enforcement agents in their law enforcement 
efforts.  
The Judge noted that there was a written agreement entered into by taskforce that allowing them 
to conduct joint investigations, nonetheless the mere absence of a proper clear legal framework 
that controls how such partnerships are to be controlled could have caused the clash between the 
EACC and the KRA. 
The lack of cooperation between different agents involved can prevent a case from being brought 
to court or its completion in investigation. According to the Judge investigations for period of ten 
years was arbitrarily long, regardless of the cases’ complexity. This caused problems such as the 
untimely leakage of the report before the completion of the investigation. 
4.5. Republic v Heinz Andreas Schaller and Another [2016] eKLR 
This case depicted the challenges of multi-agency cooperation over which law enforcement agency 
had the authority to confiscate criminal assets. The confiscation was to happen subject to a mutual 
assistance request by the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Germany. 
The ARA made an application to court seeking orders of restraint, preservation and seizure of 
funds believed proceeds of crime and conduct money laundering investigations. The funds were 
held at Imperial Bank Limited and Barclays Bank of Kenya, under the names of the Respondents. 
A dispute arose between the National Police, the DPP and the ARA on where the seized funds 
should be kept. The ARA was of the opinion that they should be deposited in the Criminal Asset 
Recovery Fund (CARF), following sections 109 and 110 of the POCAMLA.  
The state counsel, on behalf of the DPP and the Police argued that CARF was not a suitable 
mechanism to hold the funds. This was because the regulations governing the management of the 
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funds had not been implemented212. He was of the view that the DPP and the National Police 
Service be given the custody of the funds.  
It was argued on behalf of the DPP that since the seized sums were subject to investigations, 
pursuant to mutual legal assistance requested by Germany, the said funds should have been held 
by the National Police Service. The National police service nonetheless did not have a fund for 
that purpose. This was clearly the jurisdiction of the ARA. The court ordered the said funds to be 
placed in an account managed by the National Police Service and the DPP pending the completion 
of investigations. 
Inter-agency collaboration if used correctly helps in mitigating some of the challenges encountered 
in the enforcement of the law. For this to work, research highlights some of factors thought to be 
important to enable the success of such collaborations which includes; establishing clear roles, 
openness and trust213. Nevertheless, where there is tolerance of ambiguity, poor role definition, 
and uncooperativeness, such partnerships do not succeed 214.This is portrayed in this scenario 
where the law is clear that recovered assets ought to be kept in the CARF, which is meant to be 
administered by the ARA215. 
 However, the obvious lack of cooperation frustrated the enforcement of the POCAMLA and 
prevented the functionality of CARF, which is the adequate mechanism to for proper storage of 
criminal proceeds while investigations are underway. Government agencies including the DPP, 
are required to cooperate with the ARA to ensure the functionality of CARF. 
4.6. Family Bank Limited and 2 others v Director of Public Prosecutions and 2 others 
[2018] eKLR 
The applicants in this case contested whether the DPP had the authority to bring money laundering 
against them. They therefore sough conservatory orders that would prevent the intended 
prosecution. This was after Directorate of Criminal Investigation established that the applicants 
                                                          
212Regulations as contemplated under the provisions of Section 113 of the POCAMLA, dealing with the administrative 
operations of the funds. They were to be created by the Minister of Finance. 
213 Kevin M and Larissa G,‘Barriers to asset recovery, an analysis of the key barriers and recommendations for 
action,’2011, https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/Barriers%20to%20Asset%20Recovery.pdf on 1 October,2020. 
214 Kevin M and Larissa G,‘Barriers to asset recovery, an analysis of the key barriers and recommendations for action,’ 
2011, https://star.worldbank.org/sites/star/files/Barriers%20to%20Asset%20Recovery.pdf on 1 October,2020. 
215Section 111 of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (Act No 9 of 2009). 
56 
  
had breached section 44 of the POCAMLA, which mandating them to monitor and report any 
suspicious transactions. 
They considered prosecution as discriminatory and selective216 because CBK had already punished 
the appellants, by fining them one million shillings in accordance with the Prudential Guidelines. 
they were of the opinion that it was unjust for them to be taken through criminal prosecution. 
Additionally, the were a financially stable as a bank, whose prosecution would cause panic 
withdrawal of money from it by their customers. 
The appeal however denied by the Judge. He stated that there was no evidence showing selective 
prosecution of family bank, because 27 other banks were also being investigated for the same 
offences. The DPP was therefore not barred by law from instituting criminal charges against them 
as he awaited the outcome of the other 27 banks, including some officials in the CBK.  
Despite the failure of Family bank to abide by the law, the DPP applied his discretion under article 
157 of the constitution, and entered into a plea bargain agreement with the Bank. The agreement 
allowed the Bank to pay back Kshs 24.5 million to the NYS, and a balance of Kshs 40 million to 
the Court as a fine for the money-laundering charges against the bank217. He still retained the 
option of prosecuting the bank officials who facilitated the offence. On the other hand, the 
consequence of this approach as observed by Ryder, is that it does not produce a strong deterrent 
effect. He notes that where corporations such as banks are not prosecuted deterrence is seldom 
achieved. Nonetheless, if both the bank and individuals are simultaneously prosecuted and 
convicted , stronger deterrence is achieved 218.  
The case demonstrated how banks can put themselves in the negative limelight by no doing a 
plausible job in the prevention money laundering. The Bank and its officials deliberately violated 
the provisions of the POCAMLA, through financial transmission of criminal proceeds. It seems 
that the hefty financial penalties payable, in case of breach as indicated in the POCAMLA, did not 
                                                          
216Contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which protects individuals from any form of 
discrimination. 
217Court allows Family Bank plea bargaining deal in NYS case, Business Today,22 January,2019, 
https://businesstoday.co.ke/court-allows-family-bank-plea-bargaining-deal-nys-case  on 2 August 2019. 
218Ryder N ‘Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail?’  a critical and comparative analysis of the enforcement of 




deter family bank from facilitating money laundering transactions. The POCAMLA spells out the 
monetary sanctions banks are liable to pay but, the frequency and level of the application of these 
sanctions by the law enforcers also affect the compliance or non-compliance of the banks to the 
law. 
Additionally, the fact that some officials of the CBK were also implicated in the crime, and were 
under investigations, brings out some of the challenges faced by the regulator in carrying out its 
supervisory role. This can be a contributory factor to weak enforcement of the POCAMLA. 
It can be argued that where the DPP is often reluctant to prosecute the top executives involved in 
financial crimes including money laundering or even granted a full pardon, there is a shortcoming 
of law enforcement. Similarly, from the plea bargain agreement, the bank was shielded from any 
other criminal prosecution that resulted to the money laundering offences. As a result, the case has 




The above case laws illustrate the struggles faced in the process of obtaining convictions against 
banks through investigations, prosecution and recovery illicit proceeds. It also evident that efforts 
are being made by the court to ensure implementation of AML in the banking sector. However 
numerous obstacles exist, both as a result of cases filed in the same courts challenging enforcement 
and use of discretionary powers in determination of the cases. Consequently, enforcement by the 
court is marginal, and hence are less convictions against banks. 
Subsequently, there has not been strong deterrence against banking institutions as corporate bodies 
from facilitating the crime. This may result to the weakening of public confidence towards the 
financial sector, as noted by the Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices which stated that; 
‘Public confidence in banks (…) can be undermined (…) as a result of inadvertent association by 
banks with criminals. In addition, banks may lay themselves open to direct losses from fraud, either 
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through negligence in screening undesirable customers or where the integrity of their own officers 
has been undermined through association with criminals.’219 
It would appear that for an effective enforcement of AML it would be better for banks to cooperate 
with the law enforcement agencies to ensure they to ensure such confidence is not destroyed. 
However, where there are also deficiencies in the process of ensuring the implementation of the 
















                                                          




Chapter Five: Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations   
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the findings of the study, and gives the conclusion and 
recommendations that can be adopted by the different institutions mandated to fight money 
laundering. From the conclusion, the study was able to confirm the hypotheses assumed in the 
introductory chapter. 
5.1. Findings of the Study 
This study aimed at critically analysing the enforcement procedures against money laundering in 
the Kenyan banking sector. Its findings are that Kenya appears to have the proper law enforcement 
procedures to curb the offence. These procedures range from: the prevention of the offence by 
banks against the infiltration of illicit money in their system; law enforcement agents’ power to 
implement measures such as asset recovery, investigations into the offence, and prosecution of 
banks found to have violated the law. 
The prevention role done by the banks entails filing of STRS, performing customer due diligence, 
and keeping customer records. Sanctions are supposed to cause deterrence to ensure banks actually 
have their internal controls in place, and prevent them from partnering with criminals who want to 
launder money through them.  
These measures are complementary, but several problems nonetheless arise, making their success 
rate negligible. They stem from legal provisions and other external influences. These problems 
range from: deliberate violations of the law, rogue officials in the banking sector who may choose 
to facilitate illicit transactions, the duplicity of roles by different law enforcement agents hence 
causing conflicts or delays in enforcement, outdated technology used in investigation, and law 
suits opposing various actions of the law enforcement agencies. Consequently, it has bred several 
difficulties in ensuring the effectiveness of the AML regime in Kenya, such as fewer convictions 
of those culpable, especially in the banking industry. 
From the study, it is clear that these deficiencies could be the reasons why banks may choose to 
engage in deliberate violations of the law, by making use of both the legal insufficiencies and the 
flaws in the enforcement measures. Consequently, it has made it easier for the gritty money 
launderers to find ways and means to bypass the law using the banks as conduits to launder money. 
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The flaws in the enforcement measures have also had repercussions on the cases being brought to 
courts for determination. Subsequently, enforcement by the court has been marginal, and hence 
there are fewer convictions against banks. Therefore, there has not been a strong deterrence against 
banking institutions which has led to the lack of insufficient jurisprudence on the enforcement of 
the AML regime against banks in Kenya.   
It is also notable that any defiance’s on the part of banks cannot be accredited lack of legal 
instruments, but rather intentional violations of the laws by banks and loopholes in the same legal 
provisions such as lengthy court proceedings, amongst other difficulties that that make its actual 
enforcement challenging. 
5.2. Conclusion 
In light of the above findings, the Kenyan AML regime has adequately given the necessary 
measures to deter and curb the offence especially in the banking sector. It therefore appears that if 
banks actually observed the law, they would refrain from facilitating the transmission of illicit 
proceeds and cooperate with the law enforcement agencies. However, this has not been the case in 
Kenya. The deficiencies in the process of ensuring the implementation of the law and its 
enforcement have been minimal hence low compliance by banks.  
This confirms the first hypothesis of the research, which assumed that Anti-Money Laundering 
Legislation has not deterred banks from facilitating the offence. It is illustrated in the cases where 
the banks deliberately breach the law, despite the hefty sanctions that would arise from such 
violations. Furthermore, the process of implementing additional measures such as asset recovery 
or conducting investigations becomes more difficult, for the law enforcement agents, where banks 
collaborate with criminals who want to launder money through them. Subsequently verifying the 
second hypothesis which was an assumption that in instances where banks collaborate with money 
launderers, enforcement of the Anti-Money Laundering Laws becomes difficult. 
For the above reasons, this study makes the following recommendations that will help various 
institutions in fighting the crime. 
5.3. Recommendations on the Enforcement of Money Laundering Laws in the Banking 
Sector  
5.3.1. Prevention Measures Against Money Laundering by Banks  
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Banks should refrain from superficial compliance with the AML measures. There is evidence of 
superficial compliance where banks file reports on AML disclosure which are not true or fabricate 
reports to show compliance. 
The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering regulations mandate banks to implement risk-
based measures to curb money laundering. Section 6 indicates that reporting institutions ought to 
carry out risk analysis, in order to alleviate the risks connected to laundering. In line with these 
requirements, proper systems ought to be established. If well implemented, it will improve and 
enhance the accountability of banking institutions in preventing money laundering. 
Such measures can ensure that thorough investigation of suspicious transactions is done. Indeed, 
proper systems will enable them to establish the correct grounds of suspicion. If a proper 
investigation is conducted, it then becomes easy for the FRC and the CBK to establish strong 
grounds for investigation and make recommendations to the DPP for prosecution. 
Qualifications of Money Laundering Reporting Officers appointed in banking institutions should 
be indicated in the law or regulations curbing the offence. Such officers are crucial in ensuring the 
preventive measures against the offence function accordingly, but if the law is silent on their 
qualifications, banks create their standards, hence insufficiently skilled persons may be recruited 
into such positions. The law should therefore clearly set down the qualifications and experience 
needed for persons recruited in these positions. 
5.3. Measures to be Adopted by Law Enforcement Agencies 
5.3.1. Use of Alternative Sanctions to Complement Financial Sanctions  
It has been suggested that non-financial sanctions can be successful in covering the deficiencies of 
financial sanctions. Such measures include naming and shaming corporate institutions found in 
violation of the law220. This will be an addition to the sanctions provided in the POCAMLA. The 
process of shaming causes adverse publicity and can deter corporations and their officials from 
engaging in criminal activities. It can amount to a more powerful and effective sanctioning regime, 
in deterring money laundering offences by banks.  
                                                          
220Freiberg A , Department of Criminology, University of Melbourne, Vic Sentencing white collar criminals 
,2000,https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/0922/ff27754d70d0ff997be5fe47ceb599f81313.pdf  on 4 August 2019. 
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Publication of the reported violations can be done on the CBKs’ website. They would be 
highlighted in a manner that causes other institutions which envisage any misconduct is deterred. 
Such publicity can instill fear and prevent potential wrongdoing. Banks as business entities thrive 
on good reputational publicity to attract potential customers. They would be more diligent in 
preventing reputational damage as opposed to hefty fines, which if paid can be recovered via 
different business strategies. Similarly, officials who engage in the offences should be named and 
shamed to deter others from doing the same. 
Punitive injunctions221 can also be used where corporations are required to correct their internal 
control measures if they have failed. It can go as far as requiring them to implement proper 
procedures aimed at correcting their failures in preventing the crime. This can be done hand in 
hand with corporate probation orders to ensure that the injunctive orders are followed222. Under 
this mechanism, routine inspections will be conducted upon conviction, to monitor the activities. 
This can help in correcting defaults such as negligence and poor record-keeping, hence ensure the 
proper rehabilitation of companies for effective compliance with the law. 
5.3.2. Use of Statistical Data by the FRC 
An important factor in the prevention of crime is the ability to collect statistical data. The use of 
statistics allows a country to assess risks, anticipate criminal behavior, identify trends, and allocate 
resources to more vulnerable sectors. The FRC is an important intermediary for other law 
enforcement organs, as it gathers crucial data that can be used as evidence by them. Such data 
could be used in predictive policing223. The process entails taking data from different sources such 
as banks and carrying out an analysis, which is then used to prevent and respond more effectively 
to future crime224. This is through the results obtained in the analysis of the STRs. 
Predictive policing will allow law enforcers to focus on what might happen, therefore effectively 
deploy resources before the occurrence of crime. This can only be done by the creation of a 
                                                          
221Baldwin R, Enforcing regulation, Understanding Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2012, 251-252. 
222Baldwin R, Enforcing regulation, Understanding Regulation, Oxford University Press, 2012, 251-252. 
223Pearsall B, ‘Predictive policing: the future of law enforcement?’ National Institute of Justice Journal, 266,2010. 
224Pearsall B, ‘Predictive policing: the future of law enforcement?’266. 
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database that shows new, or previously unknown patterns and trends of the crime225. The STRs 
gathered by the FRC, contain a lot of information that can be used in predictive policing. 
Furthermore, STRs framework appears to be fragmented because the information is processed first 
by banks, then reported to the FRC for analytical purposes, then later referred for investigation 
upon suspicion of an offence to other agencies, causes delays in enforcement.  
Such delays can also be prevented if the FRC becomes part of the law enforcement by being given 
additional prosecution powers. The consequence of this approach is that it will work under the 
ODPP. If its officers would share in the ODPP’s prosecutorial powers, its officers can be given 
prosecutorial powers, and the supervisory role concerning AML be left to the CBK. 
The World Bank indicates that Financial Intelligence Centers with have prosecutorial powers, can 
easily avail information to the police or the prosecutors. This then increases their capability to 
reduce any delays encountered in enforcement. This is likely to facilitate the timely 
implementation of the law when it is needed because data is easily pooled with criminal 
intelligence from the prosecutor’s office226. 
Additionally, the FRC should also come up with measures that can mitigate defensive reporting 
by banks. If their database contains excessive reports that cannot be used to develop intelligence, 
its results in the poor investigation of the crime, and the failure of the prosecution 227. 
5.3.3. Asset Recovery and Confiscation 
The ARA should ensure proper coordination of criminal and civil confiscation mechanisms. Where 
civil recovery powers are exercised, but criminal prosecution is still possible, both techniques 
should be employed. It can be done by running parallel files, where one is aimed to obtain a 
criminal conviction for a predicate offence and another civil conviction to confiscate illicit 
proceeds228. 
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The legislature should also aim to consolidate of the existing roles of EACC and ARA into one. It 
will then cause the ARA to specifically deal with the recovery of criminal proceeds since 
corruption offences form part of predicate offences of money laundering. The existing framework 
creates conflicting jurisdictions since the ARA and EACC can perform asset recovery. This will 
eradicate the possibility of confusion regarding their roles, and competencies in asset recovery of 
criminal proceeds. It will also avoid the duplication of roles in the work of asset recovery. 
Any corrupt offences that resulted in money laundering should be investigated and prosecuted by 
the ODPP. It will reduce any potential conflicts that can arise where discretionary powers had 
already been exercised by the EACC or the Attorney General, not to pursue the case. 
5.3.4 Investigation and Prosecution of Money Laundering Offences by Banks 
The ODPP should adopt modern technologies in reporting, investigating, and prosecuting money 
laundering and its predicate offences. Such technology may include forensic analysis of data and 
wiretapping in investigations. This will help in making the prosecution of money laundering 
effective since launders also use advanced technology. Where prosecution of cases is successful, 
useful jurisprudence and precedents may emanate from them. Such will contribute immensely to 
any future amendments of the POCAMLA. 
In circumstances where plea negotiations are entered into between the banks and the DPP, he 
should ensure that the banking officials involved in the offences, are prosecuted and convicted if 
found guilty. This will make banks serious in preventing the occurrence of the offence, or even 
facilitating it. Moreover, there are lower chances of the occurrence of a systemic risk, if senior 
officials or employees working in banking institutions, suspected of committing the offence are 
prosecuted.  
Premature confiscation or freezing of assets should be avoided by the ARA. This can be done by 
refraining from reactive probes and conducting sufficient investigations of cases. Consequently, it 
can assist in the prevention of numerous petitions filed in court opposing the actions of law 
enforcers 
It is also important that due process is observed while investigations are done. Law enforcers 
should respect the constitutional rights of individuals and institutions while enforcing the law. If 
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law enforcers use their powers correctly by keeping in mind the constitutional rights of individuals, 
it can reduce some of the obstacles faced in the enforcement of the law. 
The DPP should not shy away from prosecuting corporations specifically, banks found to have 
violated AML laws. Corporations dislike the repercussions that may transpire as a result of such 
proceedings which have a reputational impact. Where he fails to proceed with such cases, there 
are possibilities of weakening the deterrent effects of the law, especially if violations are done 
deliberately by corporations. 
5.4.4. Establishment of a Proper Framework on Multi Agency Partnerships  
There is a need to have a clearly defined framework for multi-agency partnerships in fighting 
money laundering. This will address the challenges of the multiplicity of roles. Additionally, it 
may resolve different conflicts that may arise in the performance of their different roles. Moreover, 
if the framework is anchored in the law, it will supersede simply written agreements on 
partnerships, which may easily be breached. 
Where there is clarity on the specific functions and roles of the agencies involved in curbing the 
offence, it eradicates the problems of agencies taking up functions that they should not, in what is 
already clearly defined by the law. This can result in continued levels of improvement and 
cooperation between all the agencies involved in the enforcement process.  
Such frameworks can improve trust and coordination among agencies, and reduce duplication of 
roles and can help build trust and lead to more effective action against money laundering.  
5.4. Measures to be Adopted by the Government 
The government should provide incentives to banks to encourage them to comply with AML 
measures. Such incentives can be financial or non-financial. Where financial incentives are chosen, 
tax rebates can be used by providing taxation reliefs if a bank implemented the necessary tools and 
internal controls against money laundering. This can help in providing financial reliefs for high 
costs incurred in implementing AML measures and possibly encourage other banks to comply with 
the law. 
Additionally, it should also provide law enforcement agencies with adequate resources, that will 
ease their operations in enforcing the measures against money laundering, especially in the 
66 
  
investigation of the offence. Such include modern technology to carry out forensic analysis while 
conducting investigations, and training financial experts who can assist in the same. This can 
improve the kind of evidence presented by the prosecution and increase the chances of their 
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